Conference Paper

Exchange-based incentive mechanisms for peer-to-peer file sharing

CIS Dept., Pennsylvania Univ., Philadelphia, PA, USA
DOI: 10.1109/ICDCS.2004.1281619 Conference: Distributed Computing Systems, 2004. Proceedings. 24th International Conference on
Source: IEEE Xplore


Performance of peer-to-peer resource sharing networks depends upon the level of cooperation of the participants. To date, cash-based systems have seemed too complex, while lighter-weight credit mechanisms have not provided strong incentives for cooperation. We propose exchange-based mechanisms that provide incentives for cooperation in peer-to-peer file sharing networks. Peers give higher service priority to requests from peers that can provide a simultaneous and symmetric service in return. We generalize this approach to n-way exchanges among rings of peers and present a search algorithm for locating such rings. We have used simulation to analyze the effect of exchanges on performance. Our results show that exchange-based mechanisms can provide strong incentives for sharing, offering significant improvements in service times for sharing users compared to free-riders, without the problems and complexity of cash- or credit-based systems.

Download full-text


Available from: Michael B. Greenwald,
  • Source
    • "The principle is " I help you and someone helps me " . Exchange cycles [23], [24] like u → w → v → u can be formed, when u has resources interested for w, w has resources interested for v, and finally v has resources interested for u. Such cycles are the base for multilateral exchange in P2P systems [25]. "
    [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: This article considers selected mathematical models on the spectrum between local (microscopic) and global (macroscopic) extreme views. The classification is oriented to the large-scale property, which may not be ignored in designs of P2P systems for the today’s and future Internet. A local model exploits the knowledge directly available at a given node, leading to easy implementation. A global model needs the knowledge about the entire system, leading to preservation of certain system invariants. The discussion introduces a rich family of analytical models that fall into this classification and can be constructed using rather simple mathematical techniques.
    12/2013; 1(1):10-23. DOI:10.15393/
  • Source
    • "Capot˘ a et al. [14] formalize a resource (i.e., upload bandwidth) allocation problem in BitTorrent communities across swarms and find that for file-sharing (goal: maximal throughput) and video-streaming (goal: serve as many users as possible with a stream of a certain quality) communities there is a high price of anarchy and that today's seeders' torrent selection mechanism is suboptimal: if peers uploaded (or seeded) in a different subset of the available torrents, the overall performance would be higher. Anagnostakis and Greenwald [15] discuss multi-lateral titfor-tat trading from an incentive-compatibility perspective. "
    [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: Tit-for-tat trading lies at the heart of many incentive mechanisms for distributed systems where participants are anonymous. However, since the standard tit-for-tat approach is restricted to bilateral exchanges, data is transferred only between peers with direct and mutual interests. Generalizing tit-for-tat to multi-lateral trades where contributions can occur along cycles of interest may improve the performance of a system in terms of faster downloads without compromising the incentive-compatibility inherent to tit-for-tat trading. In this paper, we study the potential benefits and limitations of such a generalized trading in swarm-based peer-to-peer systems. Extensive simulations are performed to evaluate different techniques and to identify the crucial parameters influencing the obtainable throughput improvements and the corresponding tradeoffs. Moreover, we discuss extensions for overhead reduction and provide an optimized distributed implementation of our techniques. In summary, we find that allowing inter-swarm trades on short trading cycles can improve the throughput significantly; on the other hand, trading on long cycles does not pay off as the communication and management overhead becomes exceedingly large while the additional performance gains are marginal.
    Peer-to-Peer Computing (P2P), 2012 IEEE 12th International Conference on; 01/2012
  • Source
    • "Most of these works assumes a rather homogeneous action pattern of endusers . However, in realities, …le sharing users and normal users are quite di¤erent (Anagnostakis and Greenwald 2004). Moreover, …le sharing users yields a significant proportion of the whole network tra¢ c, and the tendency is continuously increasing (Index 2010). "
    [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: In this paper, we establish a simple framework relying on queuing theory to analyze the net neutrality on file sharing service users. We find that net neutrality regulation does not necessarily improve consumer surplus as well as the social welfare; it depends heavily on the extra traffic generated by file sharing service and the distribution cost of the content produced by the content provider, we also find that, if we allow the Internet Service Provider charging the Content Provider for content distribution, the Internet Service Provider could obtain the optimal level of the industrial profit by successfully manupulating the pricing strategy of the Content Provider.
    SSRN Electronic Journal 09/2011; DOI:10.2139/ssrn.1933757
Show more