Some aspects of the metaphysics of chemistry and the nature of the elements

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Title:
Some aspects of the metaphysics of chemistry and the nature of the elements
Author:
Scerri, E R, University of California, Los Angeles
Publication Date:
01-01-2005
Publication Info:
Postprints, UC Los Angeles
Permalink:
http://escholarship.org/uc/item/15m466nv
Keywords:
metaphysics, element, periodic table, reference theory, Kripke &, Putnam
Abstract:
There is now a considerable body of published work on the epistemology of modern chemistry,
especially with regard to the nature of quantum chemistry. In addition, the question of the
metaphysical underpinnings of chemistry has received a good deal of attention. The present article
concentrates on metaphysical considerations including the question of whether elements and
groups of elements are natural kinds. It is also argued that an appeal to the metaphysical nature of
elements can help clarify the re-emerging controversies among chemists regarding the placement
of the elements hydrogen and helium in the periodic system and the question of whether there
exists a best form of the periodic table.

HYLE – International Journal for Philosophy of Chemistry, Vol. 11 (2005), No. 2, 127-145.
Copyright  2005 by HYLE and Eric R. Scerri.
Some Aspects of the Metaphysics of
Chemistry and the Nature of the Elements
Eric R. Scerri
Abstract: There is now a considerable body of published work on the episte-
mology of modern chemistry, especially with regard to the nature of quantum
chemistry. In addition, the question of the metaphysical underpinnings of
chemistry has received a good deal of attention. The present article concen-
trates on metaphysical considerations including the question of whether ele-
ments and groups of elements are natural kinds. It is also argued that an appeal
to the metaphysical nature of elements can help clarify the re-emerging con-
troversies among chemists regarding the placement of the elements hydrogen
and helium in the periodic system and the question of whether there exists a
best form of the periodic table.
Keywords: Metaphysics, element, periodic table, reference theory, Kripke & Put-
nam.
1. Introduction
A good deal of work carried out up to this point has been of an epistemologi-
cal nature, such as the examination of the reduction of chemistry to quantum
mechanics by a number of authors (e.g. Ramsey 1997, Needham 2000,
Woody 2000, Scerri 2001). However, given the recent growth in the study of
the philosophy of chemistry, it seems appropriate to consider also the meta-
physical aspects of the field.
In the philosophy of physics, metaphysical considerations have been ex-
amined for some time and they continue to be the focus of much attention.
For example Cao has devoted a great deal of effort in arguing that a meta-
physical understanding of quantum field theory is essential in trying to com-
prehend the nature of quantum mechanics. While Cao argues for a physical
ontology consisting of entities, others equally interested in the metaphysical
foundations of physics argue that the ontology lies not in particles or entities
but in the mathematical structure of quantum field theory (Cao 2003, French
& Ladyman 2003). In the philosophy of biology one of the topics of interest

128 Eric R. Scerri
has been the question of whether biological species are natural kinds or not
(Ghiselin 1974, Hull 1977, LaPorte 2004). Several authors have appealed to
the metaphysical foundations of biology in order to clarify such questions
(Hull 1977).
In chemistry the prospects for a metaphysical project might appear to be
gloomy at first sight. Whereas theoretical physics has been increasingly
forced to embrace an abstract ontology that focuses attention on the vacuum
fluctuations, a similar move has not occurred in chemistry. Chemistry gener-
ally speaking stops at non-relativistic or relativistic quantum mechanics and
does not generally require the use of a full-blown quantum field approach and
an appeal to the quantum mechanical vacuum.1
In addition, the appeal to metaphysical considerations appears to be un-
dermined because many commentators have falsely claimed that chemistry
has become a reduced science or a service science to physics and biology
(Knight 1992, pp. 157-170; Bensaude-Vincent & Stengers 1996, pp. 207-252).
Indeed chemistry is regarded as an increasingly utilitarian science by many
chemists themselves. The commonly held view that chemistry reduces to
quantum mechanics would seem to obviate a need for a specifically chemical
ontology or metaphysics. But now that these reductionist claims have been
increasingly challenged in the philosophy of science, this would seem to clear
the way for more work on the metaphysics of chemistry.
Various philosophers of chemistry have already examined metaphysical
aspects of chemistry and in particular the question of the elements as natural
kinds (Schummer 1996, Bensaude-Vincent 1998, van Brakel 2000, Cahn 2002,
Harré 2005, Lombardi & LaBarca 2005).
The present article will appeal to two interrelated metaphysical views con-
cerning the chemical elements. The first such view is what may be called
metaphysical in the naïve, or literal, sense of the elements as being beyond
observation. The second metaphysical view considers the elements as the
fundamental entities or natural kinds of chemistry. More work has been car-
ried out regarding the latter, including the question of whether the elements
actually represent natural kinds. For example, the Kripke-Putnam causal the-
ory of reference has led to a good deal of discussion of precisely how ele-
ments should be referred to and the question of their essential properties.
There are some interesting connections between these two metaphysical as-
pects of the elements, that will be indicated as the article proceeds.

Metaphysics of Chemistry and the Nature of the Elements 129
2. First sense of metaphysics: Elements as unobserv-
able substances
A long-standing metaphysical view about the nature of elements has regarded
them as basic substances or as bearers of properties. This view has never been
completely abandoned in chemistry and I will argue that it can be brought up
to date to serve our present needs. The chemical elements, in the unobserv-
able sense, were first invoked by some Greek philosophers and continued to
play a role up to the beginning of 20th century chemistry, although in a modi-
fied sense.
The manner in which philosophically inclined chemists have regarded
elements is concerned with the ancient question of how the elements survive,
if at all, when they form compounds. This conundrum has been classically
resolved, since the time of the ancient Greek philosophers, by appealing to
the dual sense of the term ‘element’. An element can be regarded as a ‘simple
substance’ that can be isolated and that can take several different structural
forms, such as diamond or graphite, in the case of carbon. In addition, an
element can also be regarded, more fundamentally, as a ‘basic substance’,
which is the bearer of properties while at the same time being devoid of
properties.2 This metaphysical view, in the sense of elements as unobservable
bearers of properties was partly abandoned as a result of the chemical revolu-
tion. Lavoisier found it more useful to concentrate on elements as observable
simple substances that can be isolated. As many authors have argued, Lavois-
ier did not succeed in completely banishing the notion of elements as unob-
servable bearers of properties, but this question will not be pursued any fur-
ther here (Siegfried 2002).
It appears that the notion of elements as basic substances made its come-
back in the writing of Mendeleev who insisted that his periodic classification
was primarily concerned with this sense of the term ‘element’ and not as ob-
servable simple substances. However, Mendeleev did not merely return to the
ancient view whereby the elements as basic substances were completely de-
void of properties or characteristics. For Mendeleev a basic substance pos-
sessed at least one attribute, namely its atomic weight which served to distin-
guish it from other elements and which was used to order the elements in a
unique sequence.
The distinction between elements as basic substances and as simple sub-
stances was held to be of crucial importance by Mendeleev. There are many
passages in his classic textbook, The Principles of Chemistry, in which he goes
to great lengths to explain it.
It is useful in this sense to make a clear distinction between the conception of
an element as a separate homogeneous substance, and as a material but invisible
part of a compound. Mercury oxide does not contain two simple bodies, a gas

130 Eric R. Scerri
and a metal, but two elements, mercury and oxygen, which, when free, are a
gas and a metal. Neither mercury as a metal nor oxygen as a gas is contained in
mercury oxide; it only contains the substance of the elements, just as steam
only contains the substance of ice, but not ice itself, or as corn contains the
substance of the seed but not the seed itself. [Mendeleev 1891, p. 23]
In the 20th century Paneth, one of the founders of radiochemistry, similarly
upheld the view that it is only the element in the second sense, as a basic sub-
stance, that survives when sodium and chlorine combine to create sodium
chloride. On the other hand, sodium and chlorine, as simple substances, con-
sist of a gray metal and a green gas respectively, properties that do not sur-
vive when these elements combine together as simple substances. However,
drawing on the recent discoveries of physics and especially the work of
Moseley, Paneth changed the characteristic of an element as a basic substance
from its atomic weight to its atomic number (Paneth 1962).
In addition, Paneth’s philosophical message was to suggest that chemists
typically adopt an ‘intermediate position’ between what he termed naïve real-
ism and a metaphysical view. At other times, Paneth described this contrast
as being one between naïve realism and the reductive view provided by phys-
ics. Such distinctions may sound rather unusual to modern philosophers and,
of course, Paneth was not a professional philosopher, thus possibly account-
ing for his choice of terminology. However, what Paneth had to say on the
nature of chemistry and the elements, coupled with the fact that he was re-
sponsible for the introduction of the current definition of a chemical ele-
ment, obliges us to examine his philosophical views more closely. One might
consider that Paneth’s terminology is somewhat unfortunate since he was not
contrasting realism in general with metaphysics as these positions are gener-
ally understood, nor was he contrasting realism with reductionism as gener-
ally understood. Instead, Paneth was contrasting a macroscopic view of
chemical phenomena (naïve realism) with a microscopic description (reduc-
tion to physics). But it must also be appreciated that Paneth’s view was cen-
tered on the contrast between elements as simple substances (naïve realism)
and elements as basic substances (metaphysical in the sense of being beyond
observation). For Paneth reduction via physics represented a process leading
to less and less observability of the kind that is more familiar to the chemist.3
Paneth claimed that the chemist could afford to take a naïvely realistic
attitude in the case of most observed properties. For example, the ore of mer-
cury, called cinnabar, can be regarded as just being red even though the chem-
ist knows that the red color can be further reduced to a specific range of
frequencies of reflected light. But Paneth also claimed that such a form of
naïve realism, as accepting elemental properties at face value, breaks down
when the chemist is confronted with the question discussed earlier regarding
the persistence of elements in compounds. In such a case, the chemist is