Should environmental projects be subsidised? An empirical analysis

Source: OAI

ABSTRACT Imperfect markets, asymmetric information and transboundary pollution are all characteristics that in most cases lead to inefficient “market” outcomes, and which thus are arguments for (public) intervention in the market. On the other hand, these characteristics also imply strategic behaviour by the economic agents, and then the effects of public intervention may be different from the traditional results of e.g. subsidies. The point of departure for this paper is the trading of an environmental project in a market with the above mentioned characteristics and where the pollution is transboundary. The trade is promoted by (foreign) authorities in that they offer a grant is trade takes place. We show that the effects of the grant strongly depend on the interests of the authorities, and that the subsidisation does not necessarily make the trading outcome more efficient.

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    ABSTRACT: Colman, A. M. (1998). Rationality assumptions of game theory and the backward induction paradox. In M. Oaksford & N. Chater (Eds), Rational models of cognition (pp. 353-371). Oxford: Oxford University Press. A survey of key concepts of game theory Game theory models interactive decision making in terms of players, strategies, and payoffs. Conventional (individual) decision theory cannot prescribe rational choice in games, because a player cannot maximize expected utility without knowing how the coplayer(s) will act. Game theory, therefore, incorporates assumptions of common knowledge in addition to rationality. Rational players choose dominant strategies whenever possible, but many games lack such strategies. Every finite game has a Nash equilibrium, and this is the key solution concept of game theory, but the theory is indeterminate, because many games have multiple equilibria. Various criteria for equilibrium selection have been proposed. Experimental games provide information about the strategic behavior of human decision makers with bounded rationality. Evolutionary game theory helps to explain the evolution of cooperation and altruism and adaptive learning in repeated games.
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    ABSTRACT: This paper develops a welfare-theoretic argument for regional policy makers to subsidize an industry that has access to superior production technology in another region. The analytical framework is based on a standard general equilibrium model where two regions operating within a federal system are connected by goods trade and capital mobility. Optimal regional policy is designed to improve the capital terms of trade and depends on regional production patterns. Only when the technologically deficient region is diversified in production will optimal policy involve subsidization of an industry that has access to superior technology in another region. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1995
    Open Economies Review 02/1995; 6(3):255-263. DOI:10.1007/BF01000084 · 0.44 Impact Factor
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    ABSTRACT: The paper offers a perspective on environmental predicament of economies in transition. Emphasis is put on how these economies finance their environmental needs. It is observed that the demand for environmental financing can be affected both by environmental policy measures (such as internalization of externalities) and by other factors (such as the softness of budget constraints faced by firms). The role of subsidies – in many countries of the Central and Eastern European region provided through special purpose ‘environmental funds’ – is then scrutinized. In particular the question is asked whether such funds crowd out commercial capital from the market. Conditions are discussed that would allow the funds to play their constructive environmental roles without crowding out private financing. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998
    Environmental and Resource Economics 04/1998; 11(3):521-538. DOI:10.1023/A:1008220017910 · 1.52 Impact Factor


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