A parietal-premotor network for movement intention and motor awareness.

Centre de Neuroscience Cognitive, UMR 5229, CNRS, Bron, France.
Trends in Cognitive Sciences (Impact Factor: 21.15). 10/2009; 13(10):411-9. DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2009.08.001
Source: PubMed

ABSTRACT It is commonly assumed that we are conscious of our movements mainly because we can sense ourselves moving as ongoing peripheral information coming from our muscles and retina reaches the brain. Recent evidence, however, suggests that, contrary to common beliefs, conscious intention to move is independent of movement execution per se. We propose that during movement execution it is our initial intentions that we are mainly aware of. Furthermore, the experience of moving as a conscious act is associated with increased activity in a specific brain region: the posterior parietal cortex. We speculate that movement intention and awareness are generated and monitored in this region. We put forward a general framework of the cognitive and neural processes involved in movement intention and motor awareness.

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    Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 02/2015; 9:83. DOI:10.3389/fnhum.2015.00083 · 2.90 Impact Factor
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    Aaron Schurger, Sebo Uithol
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    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 03/2015; in press. DOI:10.1007/s13164-014-0223-2

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