Sirigu, A.: A parietal-premotor network for movement intention and motor awareness. Trends Cogn. Science 13, 411-419

Centre de Neuroscience Cognitive, UMR 5229, CNRS, Bron, France.
Trends in Cognitive Sciences (Impact Factor: 21.97). 10/2009; 13(10):411-9. DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2009.08.001
Source: PubMed


It is commonly assumed that we are conscious of our movements mainly because we can sense ourselves moving as ongoing peripheral information coming from our muscles and retina reaches the brain. Recent evidence, however, suggests that, contrary to common beliefs, conscious intention to move is independent of movement execution per se. We propose that during movement execution it is our initial intentions that we are mainly aware of. Furthermore, the experience of moving as a conscious act is associated with increased activity in a specific brain region: the posterior parietal cortex. We speculate that movement intention and awareness are generated and monitored in this region. We put forward a general framework of the cognitive and neural processes involved in movement intention and motor awareness.

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Available from: Angela Sirigu, Oct 29, 2014
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    • "Awareness of the motor intention presumably arises when neural activity in specific brain circuits – including the premotor cortex , the supplementary motor areas , and the posterior parietal cortex ( Lau et al . , 2004 ; Desmurget and Sirigu , 2009 ) – exceeds an individual ' s threshold level , and therefore only after specific movement - related brain processes occurred unconsciously . While previous studies shed lights on neural ( Libet et al . "
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    ABSTRACT: The temporal relationship between our conscious intentions to act and the action itself has been widely investigated. Previous research consistently shows that the motor intention enters awareness a few hundred milliseconds before movement onset. As research in other domains has shown that most behavior is affected by the emotional state people are in, it is remarkable that the role of emotional states on intention awareness has never been investigated. Here we tested the hypothesis that positive and negative affects have opposite effects on the temporal relationship between the conscious intention to act and the action itself. A mood induction procedure that combined guided imagery and music listening was employed to induce positive, negative, or neutral affective states. After each mood induction session, participants were asked to execute voluntary self-paced movements and to report when they formed the intention to act. Exposure to pleasant material, as compared to exposure to unpleasant material, enhanced positive affect and dampened negative affect. Importantly, in the positive affect condition participants reported their intention to act earlier in time with respect to action onset, as compared to when they were in the negative or in the neutral affect conditions. Conversely the reported time of the intention to act when participants experienced negative affect did not differ significantly from the neutral condition. These findings suggest that the temporal relationship between the conscious intention to act and the action itself is malleable to changes in affective states and may indicate that positive affect enhances intentional awareness.
    Frontiers in Psychology 08/2015; 6(1307). DOI:10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01307 · 2.80 Impact Factor
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    • ", 2010 ; Miele , Wager , Mitchell , & Metcalfe , 2011 ) , but also in other areas such as the anterior insula and parietal reach regions ( PRR ) , given previous accounts suggesting a key role of these areas in the sense of agency ( Farrer et al . , 2003 , 2004 ; Karnath & Baier , 2010a ; Karnath , Baier , & Nagele , 2005 ; Sperduti , Delaveau , Fossati , & Nadel , 2011 ) and motor awareness ( Assal , Schwartz , & Vuilleumier , 2007 ; Desmurget & Sirigu , 2009 ; Sirigu et al . , 2004 ) . "
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    ABSTRACT: Metacognition refers to the ability to discriminate between one’s own correct and incorrect decisions. The neurobiological underpinnings of metacognition have mainly been studied in perceptual decision-making. Here we investigated whether differences in brain structure predict individual variability in metacognitive sensitivity for visuomotor performance. Participants had to draw straight trajectories toward visual targets, which could unpredictably deviate around detection threshold, report such deviations when detected, and rate their confidence level for such reports. Structural brain MRI analyses revealed that larger gray-matter volume (GMV) in the left middle occipital gyrus, left medial parietal cortex, and right postcentral gyrus predicted higher deviation detection sensitivity. By contrast, larger GMV in the right prefrontal cortex but also right anterior insula and right fusiform gyrus predicted higher metacognitive sensitivity. These results extend past research by linking metacognitive sensitivity for visuomotor behavior to brain areas involved in action agency (insula), executive control (prefrontal cortex) and vision (fusiform).
    Consciousness and Cognition 07/2015; 36(November 2015):327-337. DOI:10.1016/j.concog.2015.07.012 · 2.31 Impact Factor
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    • "This cluster exhibited specific co-activation with the SMA, the left anterior IPS/SMG, bilateral putamen and thalami, and showed a clear involvement in basic motor control functions. This finding is consistent with a large body of literature on a parietal–premotor network involved in action planning (Jeannerod et al. 1995; Wise et al. 1997; Rushworth et al. 2003; Desmurget and Sirigu 2009) and RSFC delineations of a " sensorimotor network " (Smith et al. 2009; Power et al. 2011). Ventrally, the IFJ bordered a cluster that extended on the IFG (Cluster 3). "
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    ABSTRACT: The inferior frontal junction (IFJ) area, a small region in the posterior lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC), has received increasing interest in recent years due to its central involvement in the control of action, attention, and memory. Yet, both its function and anatomy remain controversial. Here, we employed a meta-analytic parcellation of the left LPFC to show that the IFJ can be isolated based on its specific functional connections. A seed region, oriented along the left inferior frontal sulcus (IFS), was subdivided via cluster analyses of voxel-wise whole-brain co-activation patterns. The ensuing clusters were characterized by their unique connections, the functional profiles of associated experiments, and an independent topic mapping approach. A cluster at the posterior end of the IFS matched previous descriptions of the IFJ in location and extent and could be distinguished from a more caudal cluster involved in motor control, a more ventral cluster involved in linguistic processing, and 3 more rostral clusters involved in other aspects of cognitive control. Overall, our findings highlight that the IFJ constitutes a core functional unit within the frontal lobe and delineate its borders. Implications for the IFJ's role in human cognition and the organizational principles of the frontal lobe are discussed. © The Author 2015. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail:
    Cerebral Cortex 04/2015; DOI:10.1093/cercor/bhv073 · 8.67 Impact Factor
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