Cultura y cognición. La naturaleza heterogénea del pensamiento

Avances en Psicología Latinoamericana 01/2005; 23(1).
Source: DOAJ


El trabajo que presentamos a continuación constituye una aproximación cultural al estudiode determinadas cuestiones básicas sobre la naturaleza del pensamiento humano. En concreto,estamos interesados en demostrar la estrecha relación existente entre escenarios de actividad,modos de discurso y tipos de pensamiento. Para ello, tomamos como modelo interpretativo lahipótesis de la heterogeneidad del pensamiento verbal y diseñamos una investigación eneducación de adultos para constatar las hipótesis básicas de dicho modelo. Nuestras hipótesisquedaron corroboradas. Se constató que la escolarización influye en la elección de destrezas yrecursos semióticos. Encontramos que las alumnas con mayor experiencia escolar usarondestrezas con una mayor planificación y recursos semióticos más descontextualizados. Por otrolado, obtuvimos evidencias para defender la heterogeneidad del pensamiento verbal. Losalumnas de pregraduados usaron recursos psicológicos asociados tanto al escenario cotidianocomo al científico en función de cómo percibían las demandas de la tarea. Y, por último, lasalumnas de pregraduado han transferido conceptos científicos hacia un escenario cotidiano.Esta transferencia es posible porque las alumnas de pregraduado han reconocido diferentesdemandas en la tarea y han considerado la utilidad del uso de los conceptos científicos en unescenario cotidiano con estas restricciones.

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Available from: Mercedes Cubero Pérez, Oct 13, 2015
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