The Strategic Games Matrix (SGM) as a new tool for strategic management via game theory.

Sistemas & Gestão 01/2006;
Source: DOAJ


This paper develops and presents some original game theory concepts utilizations for the formulation of company’s cooperative and competitive strategies, having as basis the Strategic Games Matrix (SGM). The concepts and results from SGM are applied to analysis and formulation of entrepreneurial strategies, as a support tool to complex business structures strategic management – hierarchical or not – and for competitive and/or cooperative strategies, or a combinations of those. It is proposed a new typology for business strategic games derived from an analysis and interpretation of the SGM: Four classic strategic games types from game theory – Nash, Minimax, and Pareto, as non-hierarchical games, and Stackelberg, as a hierarchical game – are interpreted and applied to some conflict of interests situations; two new hierarchical strategic game types, applicable to limit-case situations, also derived from the SGM analysis – Dominant-Marginal, and Paternalist-Solidary – are also described and applied. A new methodology for analysis and design of competitive and cooperative strategy formulation for complex hierarchical structures strategic management, based on the SGM, is presented and applied to three level hierarchical games. The concepts of strategic scene-gaming, and of strategic dynamic positioning, are also introduced and illustrated.

Download full-text


Available from: Eliezer Arantes Da Costa, Dec 27, 2014
  • Source
    [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: The increasing scarcity of water resources in several regional and country scenarios is progressively assuming alarming significance for policymakers, businesspersons, community leaders, and researchers, considering the multi-user conflicting interests covering relevant social, economic, political and environmental aspects, involving issues as wide as human consumption, irrigation, process industries, fishing, hydroelectricity, tourism, transportation, flora and fauna preservation, flood control, recreation and leisure, environmental protection and pollution control. Historically, these conflicting stakeholders have been treating this subject mainly as a disputing issue, competing for these vital resources, or in a few cases, cooperating to find negotiable solutions. This paper proposes a general framework for multilevel multi-stakeholder water resources management strategies modeling using the Strategic Games Matrix (SGM), and applies it to the Lake Päijänne Case (Finland) regulation problem, originally described and treated by Hämäläinen, Kettunen, Marttunen & Ehtamo (2001). Four classic strategic games (Nash, Minimax, Pareto, and Stackelberg), mapped on SGM cells, are interpreted and applied to model conflicts of interests among the stakeholders; additionally, two hierarchical strategic limit-cases games (Dominant-Marginal, and Paternalistic-Solidary), also mapped on SGM cells, are similarly described and applied. Our methodology describes and applies the SGM to support the formulation of the Lake Päijänne regulation management strategies for the competitive and cooperative multilevel multi-stakeholder conflicts of interest treatment. 2
    Academy of Management 2006 Annual Meeting, Philadelphia; 08/2006
  • [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: Some interesting papers apply concepts and modeling approaches for multiple interacting intelligent autonomous agents control systems analysis and design inspired in game theory, where 'players' are treated as 'agents', in several conflicts of interests situations. This paper presents and uses the named strategic games matrix (SGM) as a general framework for these new types of control problems. A methodology for analysis of hierarchical multilevel architectures models based on the SGM concept is applied to a water resources regulation control problem, with multiple interacting autonomous stakeholders, as posed by Hamalaien et al as "The Paijanne lake regulation policy" case.
    Intelligent Control, 2007. ISIC 2007. IEEE 22nd International Symposium on; 11/2007
  • Source
    [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: The objective of the current research is the development of a new conceptual model aiming to represent, in an integrated manner, the many situations of conflict of interests as a basis for analysis and design of hierarchical multiagent systems control and for the improvement of the methodology for betterment of the managers’ skills to deal with the strategic management of such conflicts. The investigation method used was a comparative analysis of the unique characteristics of classical games from Game Theory – Nash, Stackelberg, Pareto, and Minimax – searching, among them, their commonalities and differentiations. This investigation identified two distinct dimensions that enabled the conception and construction of a matrix to represent, in a integrated form, those four games mentioned above. The resulting conceptual model provides a comprehensive analytical scheme, inspired in the theory of games, and is used to explain, describe, interpret and forecast behaviors of autonomous agents involved in situations of conflict of interests and, in some cases, to prescribe the more adequate decisions. The Strategic Games Matrix (SGM) proposed and used in this study establishes a conceptual reference framework mapping six different types of games. In it, the assumptions for classic game models, among others for limit-cases, are used in an integrated and complementary manner. The SGM deals with both competitive and cooperative games, as well as balanced and unbalanced ones, taking into consideration both the players´ competitive postures and the power-ratio assumed by each one. The SGM contemplates in an innovative way the treatment of multiple simultaneous strategic sub-games among the agents involved. The application of the SGM concepts to complex systems – hierarchical or not –, with multiple autonomous intelligent interactive agents, provides a methodology of utility for analysis and design of their control strategies. An important part of this study is the exploratory experiments with pedagogical purpose. Such business games, played in a computer, indicate that the participants increase their perception to understand the various games to play, and their ability to act at each one of them. This use of the SGM leads each participant to analyze conflict of interests’ situations and to improve its strategic decisions: Through an interactive dynamic process of trial and error he/she ends up learning how to make better decisions taking into consideration the likely decisions of the other agents involved as well as her/his evaluation of the consequences of their choices.
    04/2008, Degree: Ph.D., Supervisor: Celso Pascoli Bottura