Mecanismos de solución de los problemas de deuda internacional: análisis formal de algunas propuestas recientes

Análisis Económico 01/2004;
Source: DOAJ

ABSTRACT En este artículo se presentan varios modelos que analizan formalmente algunas propuestas recientes para modificar la forma mediante la cual se solucionan los problemas de deuda internacional. Entre estas propuestas destacan la de crear una institución similar a la de la bancarrota –de manera que un país pueda acudir a una que la proteja frente a sus acreedores– y la de incluir Cláusulas de Acción Colectiva en los contratos de deuda internacional.

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