Prefrontal cortex and cognitive control: motivating functional hierarchies.

Nature Neuroscience (Impact Factor: 14.98). 08/2009; 12(7):821-2. DOI: 10.1038/nn0709-821
Source: PubMed


Available from: Tobias Egner, Jun 15, 2015
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    ABSTRACT: The anticipation of pain has been investigated in a variety of brain imaging studies. Importantly, today there is no clear overall picture of the areas that are involved in different studies and the exact role of these regions in pain expectation remains especially unexploited. To address this issue, we used activation likelihood estimation meta-analysis to analyze pain anticipation in several neuroimaging studies. A total of 19 functional magnetic resonance imaging were included in the analysis to search for the cortical areas involved in pain anticipation in human experimental models. During anticipation, activated foci were found in the dorsolateral prefrontal, midcingulate and anterior insula cortices, medial and inferior frontal gyri, inferior parietal lobule, middle and superior temporal gyrus, thalamus, and caudate. Deactivated foci were found in the anterior cingulate, superior frontal gyrus, parahippocampal gyrus and in the claustrum. The results of the meta-analytic connectivity analysis provide an overall view of the brain responses triggered by the anticipation of a noxious stimulus. Such a highly distributed perceptual set of self-regulation may prime brain regions to process information where emotion, action and perception as well as their related subcategories play a central role. Not only do these findings provide important information on the neural events when anticipating pain, but also they may give a perspective into nocebo responses, whereby negative expectations may lead to pain worsening. Hum Brain Mapp, 2014. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
    Human Brain Mapping 12/2014; 36(5). DOI:10.1002/hbm.22727 · 6.92 Impact Factor
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    07/2013, Supervisor: María Jesús Funes & Juan Lupiáñez
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    ABSTRACT: Embodied cognitive science has argued that cognition is embodied principally in virtue of gross morphological and sensorimotor features. This thesis argues that cognition is also internally embodied in affective and fine-grained physiological features whose transformative roles remain mostly unnoticed in contemporary cognitive science. I call this ‘proper embodiment’. I approach this larger subject by examining various emotion theories in philosophy and psychology. These tend to emphasise one of the many gross components of emotional processes, such as ‘feeling’ or ‘judgement’ to the detriment of the others, often leading to an artificial emotion-cognition distinction even within emotion science itself. Attempts to reconcile this by putting the gross components back together, such as Jesse Prinz’s “embodied appraisal theory”, are, I argue, destined to failure because the vernacular concept of emotion which is used as the explanandum is not a natural kind and is not amenable to scientific explication. I examine Antonio Damasio’s proposal that emotion is involved in paradigmatic ‘cognitive’ processing such as rational decision making, and argue (1) that the research he discusses does not warrant the particular hypothesis he favours, and (2) that Damasio’s account, though in many ways a step in the right direction, nonetheless continues to endorse a framework which sees affect and cognition as separate (though now highly interacting) faculties. I further argue that the conflation of ‘affect’ and ‘emotion’ may be the source of some confusion in emotion theory and that affect needs to be properly distinguished from ‘emotion’. I examine some dissociations in the pain literature which give us further empirical evidence that, as with the emotions, affect is a distinct component along with more cognitive elements of pain. I then argue that affect is distinctive in being grounded in homeostatic regulative activity in the body proper. With the distinction between affect, emotion, and cognition in hand, and the associated grounding of affect in bodily activity, I then survey evidence that bodily affect is also involved in perception and in paradigmatic cognitive processes such as attention and executive function. I argue that this relation is not ‘merely’ casual. Instead, affect (grounded in fine-grained details of internal bodily activity) is partially constitutive of cognition, participating in cognitive processing and contributing to perceptual and cognitive phenomenology. Finally I review some work in evolutionary robotics which reaches a similar conclusion, suggesting that the particular fine details of embodiment, such as molecular signalling between both neural and somatic cells matters to cognition. I conclude that cognition is ‘properly embodied’ in that it is partially constituted by the many fine-grained bodily processes involved in affect (as demonstrated in the thesis) and plausibly by a wide variety of other fine-grained bodily processes that likewise tend to escape the net of contemporary cognitive science.
    School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, The University of Edinburgh, 06/2012, Degree: PhD, Supervisor: Andy Clark