The Game of the Name in Cryptographic Tables

08/1999; DOI: 10.1007/3-540-46674-6_3
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ABSTRACT We present a name-passing calculus that can be regarded as a simplified pi-calculus equipped with a cryptographic table. The latter is a data structure representing the relationships among names. We apply the calculus to the modelling and verification of secrecy and authenticity properties in cryptographic protocols relying on symmetric shared keys. Following classical approaches [8], we formulate the verification task as a reachability problem and prove its decidability assuming finite principals and bounds on the sorts of the messages synthesized by the attacker.

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    ABSTRACT: This paper is a survey on the twenty years development of security protocols research. The state of the art in the application of formal methods to the design and analysis of security protocols is presented. Some major
    Journal of Software 01/2003;
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    ABSTRACT: Properties of security protocols such as authentication and secrecy are often verified by explictly generating an operational model of the protocol and then seeking for insecure states. However, message exchange between the intruder and the honest participants induces a form of state explosion that makes the model infinite in principle. Building on previous work on symbolic semantics, we propose a general framework for automatic analysis of security protocols that make use of a variety of crypto-functions. We start from a base language akin to the spi-calculus, equipped with a set of generic cryptographic primitives. We propose a symbolic operational semantics that relies on unification and provides finite and effective protocol models. Next, we give a method to carry out trace analysis directly on the symbolic model. Under certain conditions on the given cryptographic primitives, our method is proven complete for the considered class of properties.
    Proceedings of the 13th International Conference on Concurrency Theory; 08/2002
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