Development of the Just Culture Assessment Tool: Measuring the Perceptions of Health-Care Professionals in Hospitals.
ABSTRACT Given the growing support for establishing a just patient safety culture in health-care settings, a valid tool is needed to assess and improve just patient safety culture. The purpose of this study was to develop a measure of individual perceptions of just culture for a hospital setting.
The 27-item survey was administered to 998 members of a health-care staff in a pediatric research hospital as part of the hospital's ongoing patient safety culture assessment process. Subscales included balancing a blame-free approach with accountability, feedback and communication, openness of communication, quality of the event reporting process, continuous improvement, and trust. The final sample of 404 participants (40% response rate) included nurses, physicians, pharmacists, and other hospital staff members involved in patient care. Confirmatory factor analysis was used to test the internal structure of the measure and reliability analyses were conducted on the subscales.
Moderate support for the factor structure was established with confirmatory factor analysis. After modifications were made to improve statistical fit, the final version of the measure included 6 subscales loading onto one higher-order dimension. Additionally, Cronbach α reliability scores for the subscales were positive, with each dimension being above 0.7 with the exception of one.
The instrument designed and tested in this study demonstrated adequate structure and reliability. Given the uniqueness of the current sample, further verification of the JCAT is needed from hospitals that serve broader populations. A validated tool could also be used to evaluate the relation between just culture and patient safety outcomes.
- SourceAvailable from: Anthony Goudie[Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
ABSTRACT: Many thousands of patients die every year in the United States as a result of serious and largely preventable safety events or medical errors. Safety events are common in hospitalized children. We conducted a quality improvement initiative to implement cultural and system changes with the goal of reducing serious safety events (SSEs) by 80% within 4 years at our large, urban pediatric hospital. A multidisciplinary SSE reduction team reviewed the safety literature, examined recent SSEs, interviewed internal leaders, and visited other leading organizations. Senior hospital leaders provided oversight, monitored progress, and helped to overcome barriers. Interventions focused on: (1) error prevention; (2) restructuring patient safety governance; (3) a new root cause analysis process and a common cause database; (4) a highly visible lessons learned program; and (5) specific tactical interventions for high-risk areas. Our outcome measures were the rate of SSEs and the change in patient safety culture. SSEs per 10000 adjusted patient-days decreased from a mean of 0.9 at baseline to 0.3 (P < .0001). The days between SSEs increased from a mean of 19.4 at baseline to 55.2 (P < .0001). After a worsening of patient safety culture outcomes in the first year of intervention, significant improvements were observed between 2007 and 2009. Our multifaceted approach was associated with a significant and sustained reduction of SSEs and improvements in patient safety culture. Multisite studies are needed to better understand contextual factors and the significance of specific interventions.PEDIATRICS 07/2012; 130(2):e423-31. DOI:10.1542/peds.2011-3566 · 5.47 Impact Factor
Article: Human Error: Models and Management[Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
ABSTRACT: Two approaches to the problem of human fallibility exist: the person and the system approaches. The person approach focuses on the errors of individuals, blaming them for forgetfulness, inattention, or moral weakness. The system approach concentrates on the conditions under which individuals work and tries to build defences to avert errors or mitigate their effects. High reliability organisations - which have less than their fair share of accidents - recognise that human variability is a force to harness in averting errors, but they work hard to focus that variability and are constantly preoccupied with the possibility of failure.BMJ Clinical Research 04/2000; 320(7237):768-70. DOI:10.1136/bmj.320.7237.768 · 14.09 Impact Factor
- JAMA The Journal of the American Medical Association 07/2002; 288(4):501-7. · 35.29 Impact Factor