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FUNDAMENTOS TEÓRICOS DE LA INTEGRACIÓN VERTICAL 1

ABSTRACT In order to analyze the concept of the vertical integration of companies and the possible effect s on the final prices and the power of market, this article leads from an approach of which it is the company and the relationships that occur internally and externally considering the approach which is different from the neoclassic conventional model. The n, the foundations and theoretical determinants of vertical integration, cuasi - integration and partial vertical integration are settled down. And finally emphasis in the market power, the double marginalization and the distortions of market that are desc ribed to the possible effects derived from this integration.

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