Assessing catch shares’ effects evidence from Federal United States and associated British Columbian fisheries

Marine Policy (Impact Factor: 2.62). 05/2012; 36(3). DOI: 10.1016/j.marpol.2011.10.014

ABSTRACT What are the effects of transitioning traditionally managed fisheries to incentive-based catch shares fisheries? In a study of all major United States federal catch share fisheries and associated shared stock fisheries in British Columbia, catch shares result in environmental improvements, economic improvements, and a mixture of changes in social performance, relative to the race for fish under traditional management. Environmentally, compliance with total allowable catch increases and discards decrease. Economically, vessel yields rise, total revenues grow, and long-term stock increases are encouraged. Socially, safety increases, some port areas modestly consolidate, needed processing capacity often reduces, and labor markets shift from part time jobs to full time jobs with similar total employment. Newer catch shares address many social concerns through careful design.

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    • "The reduced profit margin caused by leasing quota in the TSRL fishery has created a business structure orientated towards fishing more days at sea, catching larger quantities of fish, using smaller vessels, and targeting times of higher expected revenue, often with less regard to the physical risk caused by hazardous weather conditions . This is in contrast to the expectation that ITQ management lowers fishing intensity and improves safety at sea through the removal of " race to fish " incentives (National Research Council, 1999; Grimm et al., 2012). This is because the incentive structure generated by ITQ management, theoretically regulating the behaviour of quota owners, does not apply to lease quota fishers (Bradshaw, 2004; Gibbs, 2009). "
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    ABSTRACT: Fishing for revenue: how leasing quota can be hazardous to your health. – ICES Journal of Marine Science, doi.10.1093/icesjms/fsu019. Fisheries management decisions have the potential to influence the safety of fishers by affecting how and when they fish. This implies a responsibility of government agencies to consider how fishers may behave under different policies and regulations in order to reduce the incidence of undesirable operational health and safety outcomes. In the Tasmanian southern rock lobster fishery, Australia, the expan-sion of the quota lease market under individual transferable quota (ITQ) management coincided with a rise in the number of commercial fishing fatalities, with five between 2008 and 2012. A discrete choice model of daily participation was fitted to compare whether physical risk tolerance varied between fishers who owned the majority of their quota units (quota owners) and those who mainly leased (lease quota fishers). In general, fishers were averse to physical risk (wave height), however this was offset by increases in expected revenue. Lease quota fishers were more responsive to changes in expected revenue than quota owners, which contributed to risk tolerance levels that were sig-nificantly higher than those of quota owners in some areas. This pattern in behaviour appeared to be related to the cost of leasing quota. Although ITQs have often been considered to reduce the incentive for fishers to operate in hazardous weather conditions, this assumes fishing by quota owners. This analysis indicated that this doesn't hold true for lease quota fishers in an ITQ system, where in some instances there remains an economic incentive to fish in conditions with high levels of physical risk.
    ICES Journal of Marine Science 02/2014; DOI:10.1093/icesjms/fsu019 · 2.53 Impact Factor
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    • "This ability rests on the assumption that setting an appropriate total allowable catch (TAC) and allocating defined shares of the catch to individual operators will replace wasteful incentives to race and overcapitalize, with incentives to reduce costs, increase value, and act in a less myopic manner. If there is heterogeneity within the fleet, the ability to transfer quota between operators can further increase efficiency gains by creating the incentive for less efficient operators to sell out or lease their quota to those who are more efficient and for whom the quota has a higher marginal value (Arnason 1993, Herrmann 1996, Knapp 1997, Grafton et al. 2000, Hartley and Fina 2001, Grimm et al. 2012). "
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    ABSTRACT: In fisheries managed using individual transferable quotas (ITQs) it is generally assumed that quota markets are well-functioning, allowing quota to flow on either a temporary or permanent basis to those able to make best use of it. However, despite an increasing number of fisheries being managed under ITQs, empirical assessments of the quota markets that have actually evolved in these fisheries remain scarce. The Queensland Coral Reef Fin-Fish Fishery (CRFFF) on the Great Barrier Reef has been managed under a system of ITQs since 2004. Data on individual quota holdings and trades for the period 2004-2012 were used to assess the CRFFF quota market and its evolution through time. Network analysis was applied to assess market structure and the nature of lease-trading relationships. An assessment of market participants’ abilities to balance their quota accounts, i.e., gap analysis, provided insights into market functionality and how this may have changed in the period observed. Trends in ownership and trade were determined, and market participants were identified as belonging to one out of a set of seven generalized types. The emergence of groups such as investors and lease-dependent fishers is clear. In 2011-2012, 41% of coral trout quota was owned by participants that did not fish it, and 64% of total coral trout landings were made by fishers that owned only 10% of the quota. Quota brokers emerged whose influence on the market varied with the bioeconomic conditions of the fishery. Throughout the study period some quota was found to remain inactive, implying potential market inefficiencies. Contribution to this inactivity appeared asymmetrical, with most residing in the hands of smaller quota holders. The importance of transaction costs in the operation of the quota market and the inequalities that may result are discussed in light of these findings.
    ECOLOGY AND SOCIETY 01/2014; 19(3-3). DOI:10.5751/es-06637-190313 · 2.67 Impact Factor
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    ABSTRACT: This paper presents the results of a survey of US halibut IFQ holders exploring market participation, opinions about IFQs, and perceived fishery and community effects of IFQs. A four-step mail survey was sent to a stratified random sample of 14% of the total population of quota holders, producing a response rate of 46%, or 506 returned surveys. Survey results suggest that while there is a wide diversity of opinions and perceptions of IFQs, there are some predictable trends in the ways that different groups of fishery participants experience and respond to these programs. Gender, income, age, employment and ethnicity are linked to IFQ market behavior. Income, residency, and ethnicity are linked to attitudes about IFQs. A discriminate function analysis indicates that older individuals, individuals who make less money, and indigenous fishermen are more likely to sell quota and less likely to buy quota. Women and those who are primarily employed in fishing are more likely to be buyers of quota rather than sellers. Fishermen who identify as Alaska Native, residents of small remote fishing communities in the Gulf of Alaska, and low-income fishermen show the least support for IFQ management. Quota holders who have high incomes, do not consider their communities to be dependent on fishing, and residents of Community Development Quota communities express the most support for IFQs. Overall, 84% of survey respondents believe that IFQs are changing the fishing lifestyle; 75% state that IFQs are changing the values in fishing; and 75% perceive of IFQs as private property. A majority of surveyed IFQs holders perceive both positive and negative impacts of IFQs to fisheries and to communities. Perceived positive impacts include: improved safety; improved price; market stability; improved management; consumer benefits; environmental benefits; longer fishing season; and professionalization and stability of the fishing fleet. Perceived negative impacts include: limitations on access and barriers to entry; consolidation and job loss; inequities experienced by small boats, rural fishermen, and crew; creation of a privileged class of fishermen; negative environmental impacts; and less local participation.
    Marine Policy 03/2013; 38:515–522. DOI:10.1016/j.marpol.2012.08.007 · 2.62 Impact Factor
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