La política exterior de la Venezuela bolivariana

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    ABSTRACT: En el año 2009 se conmemoró el 50 aniversario de la revolución liderada por Fidel Castro y a la vez se cumplieron veinte años de la caída del Muro de Berlín, que sumió al país en una crisis profunda con graves consecuencias.A pesar de todo, mostrando una gran capacidad de supervivencia y adaptación a un mundo cambiante, el núcleo de los dirigentes históricos de la revolución se ha mantenido en el poder con unas transformaciones mínimas y muy controladas. Pero dos décadas después del inicio de la crisis parece que Cuba se encuentra en un bucle del que no encuentra la salida. Partiendo de la premisa de que las realidades sociales no son inmutables y que todo proceso histórico conlleva adaptaciones y cambios, en este trabajo se analiza la evolución de Cuba en los últimos veinte años para señalar las transformaciones ocurridas y los desafíos persistentes. En el balance se considera un logro incuestionable el mantenimiento de la soberanía nacional, y hasta cierto punto la estabilidad política y la cohesión social. Pero hay frustración en los ciudadanos por la falta de libertades políticas y económicas. También hay un deterioro continuado de la economía y de las condiciones de vida, porque no hay un modelo de desarrollo estable que asegure el bienestar futuro de los cubanos.
    Documentos CIDOB. América Latina, ISSN 1697-8137, Nº. 33, 2010.
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    ABSTRACT: The main challenge of the transition has been to redefine how the state interacts with firms, but little attention has been paid to the flip side of the relationship : how firms influence the state - especially how they exert influence on, and collude with public officials to extract advantages. Some firms in transition economies have been able to shape the rules of the game to their own advantage, at considerable social cost, creating what the authors call a"capture economy"in many countries. In the capture economy, public officials, and politicians privately sell under-provided public goods, and a range of rent-generating advantages"a la carte"to individual firms. The authors empirically investigate the dynamics of the capture economy, on the basis of new firm-level data from the 1999 Business Environment and enterprise performance survey (BEEPS), which permits the unbundling of corruption into meaningful, and measurable components. they contrast state capture (firms shaping, and affecting formulation of the rules of the game through private payments to public officials, and politicians) with influence (doing the same without recourse to payments), and with administrative corruption ("petty"forms of bribery in connection with the implementation of laws, rules, and regulations). They develop economy-wide measures for these phenomena, which are then subject to empirical measurement utilizing the BEEPS data. State capture, influence, and administrative corruption are all shown to have distinct causes, and consequences. Large incumbent firms with formal ties to the state tend to inherit influence as a legacy of the past, and tend to enjoy more secure property, and contractual rights, and higher growth rates. To compete against these influential incumbents, new entrants turn to state capture as a strategic choice - not as a substitute for innovation, but to compensate for weaknesses in the legal, and regulatory framework. When the state under-provides the public goods needed for entry and competition,"captor"firms purchase directly from the state, such private benefits as secure property rights, and removal of obstacles to improved performance - but only in a capture economy. Consistent with empirical findings in previous research on petty corruption, administrative corruption - unlike both capture and influence - is not associated with specific benefits for the firm. The focus of reform should be shifted toward channeling firms'strategies in the direction of more legitimate forms of influence, involving societal"voice", transparency reform, political accountability, and economic competition, Where state capture has distorted reform to create (or preserve) monopolistic structures, supported by powerful political interests, the challenge is particularly daunting.
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    ABSTRACT: Under anarchy, uncoordinated competitive theft by “roving bandits” destroys the incentive to invest and produce, leaving little for either the population or the bandits. Both can be better off if a bandit sets himself up as a dictator—a “stationary bandit” who monopolizes and rationalizes theft in the form of taxes. A secure autocrat has an encompassing interest in his domain that leads him to provide a peaceful order and other public goods that increase productivity. Whenever an autocrat expects a brief tenure, it pays him to confiscate those assets whose tax yield over his tenure is less than their total value. This incentive plus the inherent uncertainty of succession in dictatorships imply that autocracies will rarely have good economic performance for more than a generation. The conditions necessary for a lasting democracy are the same necessary for the security of property and contract rights that generates economic growth.
    American Political Science Review 01/2009; 87(3):567-576. · 3.93 Impact Factor


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