Article

Voluntariness of Consent to Research: A Conceptual Model

College of Physicians and Surgeons, Columbia University, USA.
The Hastings Center Report (Impact Factor: 1.08). 01/2009; 39(1):30-9. DOI: 10.1353/hcr.0.0103
Source: PubMed

ABSTRACT A good deal of policy and practice in human subjects research aims to ensure that when subjects consent to research, they do so voluntarily. To date, however, voluntariness and its impairment have been poorly conceptualized and studied. The legal doctrine of informed consent could provide a useful model.

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Available from: Robert Klitzman, Jun 19, 2015
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    • "A preliminary empirical investigation into the voluntariness of consent to research demonstrated that participants indicated that " trust in the people doing the research . . . [was] frequently cited as important motivations across all categories of respondents " as a reason for research participation (Appelbaum, Lidz, and Klitzman 2009). "
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