Article

The Role of Corporate Governance in Initial Public Offerings: Evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts

The Journal of Law and Economics (Impact Factor: 0.89). 08/2008; 51(3):539-562. DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.342700
Source: RePEc

ABSTRACT This study analyzes the impact of corporate governance structures at the initial public offering (IPO) date. We test hypotheses that firms with more shareholder-oriented governance structures receive higher valuations at the IPO stage and have better long-term performance. Our sample is a set of 107 IPOs of real estate investment trusts (REITs) between 1991 and 1998. Using a single industry and REITs in particular reduces potentially confounding effects due to differences in risk, transparency, and growth potential. We believe this-combined with our use of IPOs-mitigates the endogeneity problem present in studies of the impact of governance on seasoned firms' valuation. Our analysis indicates that firms with stronger governance structures have higher IPO valuations and better long-term operating performance than their peers. (c) 2008 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved..

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