Article

O Estado de São Paulo como um ator internacional

São Paulo em Perspectiva 01/2002; 16(2). DOI: 10.1590/S0102-88392002000200011

ABSTRACT Resumo: Discussão da influência do cenário internacional sobre as decisões dos governos subnacionais e sua ascensão como novos atores neste contexto. As informações apresentadas neste artigo resultaram da pesquisa "Gestão Pública Estratégica de Governos Subnacionais Frente aos Processos de Inserção Internacional e Inte- gração Latino-Americana", que está sendo realizada pela Fundap, PUC-SP e Cedec, e analisam de que modo um governo subnacional reage aos efeitos e à nova realidade internacional, utilizando-se o caso de São Paulo. Palavras-chave: integração regional; governos subnacionais; organismos internacionais. Abstract: A discussion of how the international scene affects the decisions of sub-national governments, and of their ascension as new actors within this context. The information presented in this article was extracted from a research project entitled "Strategic Public Strategies of Sub-national Governments Within the Context of the Processes of Latin American Global Insertion and Integration," currently being conducted by Fundap, (Foundation for Public Administration), PUC-SP (Catholic University of São Paulo) and Cedec. This article examines how sub-national governments react to changing realities at the international level, using the government of the State of São Paulo as a case in point.

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    ABSTRACT: Domestic politics and international relations are often inextricably entangled, but existing theories (particularly “state-centric” theories) do not adequately account for these linkages. When national leaders must win ratification (formal or informal) from their constituents for an international agreement, their negotiating behavior reflects the simultaneous imperatives of both a domestic political game and an international game. Using illustrations from Western economic summitry, the Panama Canal and Versailles Treaty negotiations, IMF stabilization programs, the European Community, and many other diplomatic contexts, this article offers a theory of ratification. It addresses the role of domestic preferences and coalitions, domestic political institutions and practices, the strategies and tactics of negotiators, uncertainty, the domestic reverberation of international pressures, and the interests of the chief negotiator. This theory of “two-level games” may also be applicable to many other political phenomena, such as dependency, legislative committees, and multiparty coalitions.
    International Organization 02/1988; 42(3):427-60. · 2.98 Impact Factor

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