Multilateral aid, politics and poverty: past failures and future challenges

In book: The Global Crisis in Foreign Aid, Edition: First, Chapter: 2, Publisher: Syracuse University Press, Editors: Richard Grant, Jan Nijman, pp.11-26

ABSTRACT This chapter presents an overview of empirical evidence on the successes and failures of aid programs with the aim of recommending a future role for multilateral aid agencies. We examine the impact of aid programs that have come into operation since the first Bretton Woods meetings, including long term grants and concessional assistance, major infrastructure projects operated by the multilaterals, and short term aid programs to support new governments or governments in crisis.
This evidence provides one clear message: long term aid programs have broadly failed to achieve their poverty reduction goals. Some forms of short-term aid programs, on the other hand, have been more successful.

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May 27, 2014