Article

Does Investors' Sophistication Affect Persistence and Pricing of Discretionary Accruals?

Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies 03/2007; 10(01):33-50. DOI: 10.1142/S0219091507000945
Source: RePEc

ABSTRACT This paper examines whether the sophistication of market investors influences management's strategy on discretionary accounting choice, and thus changes the persistence of discretionary accruals. The results show that the persistence of discretionary accruals for firms face with naive investors is lower than that for firms face with sophisticated investors. The results also demonstrate that sophisticated investors indeed incorporate the implications of current earnings components into future earnings in a more sufficient manner than naïve investors do.

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