Article

The Preoperative Stop/Go Sign.

*Department of Anesthesiology, Boston Medical Center, Boston, Massachusetts. .
Anesthesiology (Impact Factor: 5.16). 02/2013; DOI: 10.1097/ALN.0b013e3182887547
Source: PubMed
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