Analysis: The contribution of intelligence services to security sector reform

Conflict Security and Development 04/2005; Security & Development:87-107. DOI: 10.1080/14678800500103317

ABSTRACT The concept of security sector reform has introduced the idea that the security sector is a legitimate recipient of donor assistance, but cooperation with intelligence services remains problematic. They are principally seen as a subject for reform rather than a contributor to it. I argue that intelligence services can reduce institutional inertia in the security sector, contribute to the rejection of outdated risks and the identification of new ones, and underpin the process of reform. To do so they require careful management and effective oversight. I propose a new definition of intelligence and a new distinction between intelligence and security that aim to capture the potential contribution of intelligence services to security sector reform.

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