Observing bacteria through the lens of social evolution.

Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544, USA.
Journal of Biology 10/2008; 7(7):27. DOI: 10.1186/jbiol87
Source: PubMed

ABSTRACT Explaining the evolution of cooperative behavior is a long-standing problem for which much theory has been developed. A recent paper in BMC Biology tests central elements of this theory by manipulating a simple bacterial experimental system. This approach is useful for assessing the principles of social evolution, but we argue that more effort must be invested in the inverse problem: using social evolution theory to understand the lives of bacteria.


Available from: Carey D Nadell, Jan 30, 2014
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