Intuition, No! …Quasirationality, Yes!

Psychological Inquiry (Impact Factor: 4.73). 10/2010; 21:327-337. DOI: 10.1080/1047840X.2010.521483

ABSTRACT The miracles of intuitive judgment have long been celebrated, and they are no doubt there and worth celebrating, but our commitment to science requires us to unmask those miracles and bring them under examination. Our first task is to apply our knowledge to the development of cognitive skill in our species so that we can improve our political skill and thus reduce the yearly millions of deaths due to lack of that skill. Replacing reliance on “intuition” by turning to “quasirationality” can be our first step in that direction. This article indicates and explains how that step can be taken and describes some applications of the basic concepts that make it possible.

  • [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: Intuitions are commonly defined in terms of their supposed characteristics, for example, fast, implicit, parallel, and automatic. In this chapter, I argue that such an approach fails to provide a sufficiently rigorous definition to be the basis for scientific inquiry. Instead, I propose that intuitive thought is best understood in terms of the mechanisms that give rise to it. Intuitions may arise from the operation of type 1 processes, as in dual-process theories, they may arise from a number of different memory processes, such as associative learning, skilled memory, recognition memory, and gist memory. I also argue that many metacognitive processes, specifically, the processes by which our cognitive processes are monitored, are also a form of intuition. Emotional processes can form the basis of intuitive judgment and can also motivate behaviors and decisions. Although these processes may give rise to judgments that may all be classified as "intuitive," the characteristics of the judgments that arise from them may differ. A second goal of this chapter was to look for points of intersection between these views and to suggest avenues for future research. One such avenue is to examine the role of coherence in terms of both the information that gives rise to intuitive judgments and the processes that monitor those judgments. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the relative value of intuitive and deliberate thinking.
    01/2014: pages 35-75;
  • [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: Since the recent rejuvenation of intuition research within the management literature, significant work has been done on conceptualizing intuition. Whilst remarkable progress has been achieved in many areas of intuition, the role of intuition in creativity remains comparatively under-researched. Through an extensive review of intuition literature, we believe that a reason for this could be that intuition in the management literature is generally conceptualized as judgement. In this article we aim to extend our understanding of intuition in creativity by distinguishing between intuitive judgment and intuitive insight. Strengthening our case, this article builds on two previous research projects. The first focuses on literature-based features of intuition and the second project builds a conceptual model of knowledge types. Further informing the argument is Polanyi’s distinction of focal and subsidiary awareness. These considerations lead us to propose that there are two distinct kinds of intuition – intuitive judgement and intuitive insight.
    Management Learning 10/2012; 43(5):545–564. DOI:10.1177/1350507611434686 · 1.68 Impact Factor
  • [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: In this paper we explored three areas: decision making and information seeking, the relationship between information seeking and uncertainty, and the role of expertise in influencing information use. This was undertaken in the context of a qualitative study into decision making in the initial stages of emergency response to major incidents. The research took an interpretive approach in which activity theory is used as an analytical framework. The research provides further evidence that the context of the activity and individual differences influence the choice of decision mode and associated information behavior. We also established that information is often not used to resolve uncertainty in decision making and indeed information is often sought and used after the decision is made to justify the decision. Finally, we point to the significance of both expertise and confidence in understanding information behavior. The contribution of the research to existing theoretical frameworks is discussed and a modified version of Wilson's problem-solving model is proposed.
    Journal of the Association for Information Science and Technology 06/2014; 66(4). DOI:10.1002/asi.23204 · 2.23 Impact Factor