Article

Estimated size of the population at risk of severe adverse events after smallpox vaccination in Israel.

Sackler Faculty of Medicine, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv 69978, Israel. Electronic address: .
Vaccine (Impact Factor: 3.49). 09/2012; 30(47):6632-5. DOI: 10.1016/j.vaccine.2012.08.072
Source: PubMed

ABSTRACT The population at risk of adverse events after smallpox vaccination has increased in recent years. This has important implications for preparedness strategies against bioterrorism with the variola virus. The aim of the study was to estimate the size of this special population in Israel.
The study was conducted in January 2010. Data on patients with contraindications to smallpox vaccination, as delineated by the Israel Ministry of Health for planning post-event strategies, were retrieved from the computerized records of the Department of AIDS and Tuberculosis and the Transplantation Center of the Israel Ministry of Health. In addition, the database of the main Health Maintenance Organization in Israel which insures 60% of the national population was searched using ICD-9 codes and specific medications issued in the last quarter of 2009.
Of the 7,563,800 persons residing in Israel in January 2010, 326,318 were at risk of an adverse event after smallpox vaccination.
Approximately 4.3% of the Israeli population should not be exposed to the currently used smallpox vaccine. This knowledge is important to ensure the effectiveness of mass vaccination programs in the event of a bioterror attack.

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