Securing geographic routing in wireless sensor networks

ABSTRACT We consider the security of geographic routing (GR) that is widely used in ad hoc and wireless sensor networks due to its scalability. In GR, a node greedily forwards a packet to the neighbor that is closest to the destination. Thus, GR only requires a node to maintain the location information of its one hop neighbors. However, very little work has been done to secure GR. In a potential attack, malicious nodes may falsify their location information. Also, a malicious node can send an excessive number of packets to overload the receiving nodes and block legitimate packets from other sources. Alternatively, it can drop or misdirect received packets. To shed light on these problems, we propose an approach for robust GR via rate control, packet scheduling , and trust-based multi-path routing. In a simulation study, we also show that our robust GR can circumvent and route against attacks.

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    ABSTRACT: Wireless sensor networks offer inexpensive solutions in a wide variety of applications ranging from health, home, roads and public area monitoring to industry and aircraft control. As sensors proliferate, scalable communication protocols with low implementation requirements are pursued. Another key issue for the wider deployment of these solutions is security since the wireless sensor networks themselves are prone to security attacks. In this paper, we review geographical routing protocols, which allow for high scalability due to their localised operation while they also support mobility consuming less node and network resources since they operate on very limited overhead. We also investigate their vulnerabilities to security attacks (Sybil and selective forwarding attacks) and report efficient coutermeasures.
    Telecommunications and Multimedia (TEMU), 2012 International Conference on; 01/2012
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    ABSTRACT: Efficient defense against security attacks is a challenging task in the wireless sensor network environment. Although significant research effort has been spend on the design of trust models to detect malicious nodes based on direct and indirect evidence, this comes at the cost of additional energy consumption. The situation is further aggravated as the next generation wireless sensor network will be larger and larger. To face this problem, we propose a secure routing protocol (Ambient Trust Sensor Routing, ATSR) which adopts the geographical routing principle to cope with the network dimensions and relies on a distributed trust model for the detection of malicious nodes. Both direct and indirect trust information is taken into account to evaluate the trustworthiness of each neighbour. An important feature of the proposed routing solution is that it takes into account the remaining energy of each neighbour, thus allowing for better load balancing and network lifetime extension. Based on computer simulation results we evaluate the additional energy consumption caused by the exchange of indirect trust information and the benefits stemming from the adoption of our algorithm
    9th WSEAS International Conference on APPLIED INFORMATICS AND COMMUNICATIONS (AIC '09), Moscow, Russia; 08/2009
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    ABSTRACT: Security is currently a weak point of wireless sensor networks (WSN) impeding their proliferation although they offer flexible and low cost solutions for many every-day life applications. In WNSs, routing of data from the sensor nodes towards the destination/base station relies on the cooperation among neighbouring nodes. The realization of a trust management system which allows each node to define a trust value for each neighbour has been proposed as a powerful tool towards defending against the routing attacks. In this paper, we investigate how the trust information can be incorporated in the routing protocol and we compare based on simulation results three different trust-aware geographical routing algorithms.
    ELMAR2009, Zadar Croatia; 09/2009

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