Chapter

The Theory of Political Coalitions

New Haven
Publisher: Yale University Press
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    • "Most of the literature on voting rules compares majority requirements on the basis of their ability to prevent socially detrimental policies and to enact socially desirable ones. Since Madison (1787) and Tocqueville (1835), political scientists have long recognized that simple majority rule can lead to a " tyranny of the majority " (Wicksell 1986, Buchanan and Tullock 1962, Riker 1962) and can generate incentives to particularize bene…ts and collectivize costs (e.g., Ferejohn et al. 1987, Baron 1991). However, as Hamilton pointed out (Federalist paper No. 73), " the power of preventing bad laws includes that of preventing good ones. "
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    • "Most of the literature on voting rules compares majority requirements on the basis of their ability to prevent socially detrimental policies and to enact socially desirable ones. Since Madison (1787) and Tocqueville (1835), political scientists have long recognized that simple majority rule can lead to a " tyranny of the majority " (Wicksell 1986, Buchanan and Tullock 1962, Riker 1962) and can generate incentives to particularize bene…ts and collectivize costs (e.g., Ferejohn et al. 1987, Baron 1991). However, as Hamilton pointed out (Federalist paper No. 73), " the power of preventing bad laws includes that of preventing good ones. "
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    • "In this model, the electoral success of radical right parties is thus integrally tied to coalition politics. Although there is a large literature on the dynamics of coalition formation (S. N. Golder & Conrad, 2010; Grzymala-Busse, 2001; Laver, 1998; Laver & Schofield, 1990; Riker, 1962), this research has largely overlooked the effect of coalition participation on issue salience. Supply-side theories expect radical right parties to succeed most when identity issues are salient, and when radical parties are perceived as " owning " identity issues. "
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