Article

Audit Quality, Corporate Governance, and Earnings Management: A Meta‐Analysis

International Journal of Auditing 02/2010; 14(1):57 - 77. DOI: 10.1111/j.1099-1123.2009.00403.x

ABSTRACT Earnings management is of great concern to corporate stakeholders. While numerous studies have investigated the effects of various corporate governance and audit quality variables on earnings management, empirical evidence is rather inconsistent. This meta-analysis identifies 12 significant relationships by integrating results from 48 prior studies. For corporate governance, the independence of the board of directors and its expertise have a negative relationship with earnings management. Similar negative relationships exist between earnings management and the audit committee's independence, its size, expertise, and the number of meetings. The audit committee's share ownership has a positive effect on earnings management. For audit quality, auditor tenure, auditor size, and specialization have a negative relationship with earnings management. Auditor independence, as measured by fee ratio and total fee, is also a deterrent to earnings management.

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