The impossibility of experimental elicitation of subjective probabilities

Tel Aviv University, Tell Afif, Tel Aviv, Israel
Theory and Decision (Impact Factor: 0.48). 01/1995; 38(3):313-320. DOI: 10.1007/BF01362238

ABSTRACT We show that if decision makers may have stakes in certain events then the experimental elicitation of their subjective probabilities of these events is impossible.

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