Article

Testing theories of behavior for extensive-form two-player two-stage games

Experimental Economics (impact factor: 1.36). 04/2012; 12(2):242-251. DOI:10.1007/s10683-008-9212-6 pp.242-251

ABSTRACT We examine choices in two-player extensive-form games that give subjects opportunities for individualistic as well as other-regarding
behavior, and where each subject makes choices in a variety of games. Following an extensive search over models, where we
estimate a single parameter vector for all the games rather than different parameter vectors for each game, we find that (1)
the level-n model organizes the data well, (2) other-regarding behaviors in these games appear to consist primarily of egalitarian and
utilitarian behaviors, and (3) there is no significant evidence for reciprocal behavior.

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Keywords

choices
 
different parameter vectors
 
extensive search
 
games
 
level-n model organizes
 
models
 
reciprocal behavior
 
significant evidence
 
single parameter vector
 
two-player extensive-form games
 
utilitarian behaviors