This paper deals with intercultural aspects of privacy, particularly with regard to differences between Japanese and Western
conceptions. It starts with a reconstruction of the genealogy of Western subjectivity and human dignity as the basic assumptions
underlying Western views on privacy. An analysis of the Western concept of informational privacy is presented. The Japanese
topic of ‘‘denial of self” (Musi) as well as the concepts of Seken, Shakai and Ikai (as analyzed by the authors of the companion piece on privacy in Japan) give rise to intercultural comparisons. The paper
addresses the question of privacy in cyberspace and mass media. Finally the question of freedom of speech is related to the
Japanese concepts of Ohyake and Watakusi.
"Furthermore, development of such agreements may be difficult because of competing cultural perspectives. Attitudes to online privacy, for example, are strongly culturally determined in terms of what people hold as constituting personal privacy, the desired aims of privacy legislation and the preferred balance between individuals, social groups and institutions (Capurro 2005). Further complicating this situation is the rise of trans-national concerns which cannot be solved within state framework but rather require international bodies, or even new forms of organization (Pagallo 2013). "
[Show abstract][Hide abstract] ABSTRACT: This paper applies a very traditional position within Natural Law Theory to Cyberspace. I shall first justify a Natural Law approach to Cyberspace by exploring the difficulties raised by the Internet to traditional principles of jurisprudence and the difficulties this presents for a Positive Law Theory account of legislation of Cyberspace. This will focus on issues relating to geography. I shall then explicate the paradigm of Natural Law accounts, the Treatise on Law, by Thomas Aquinas. From this account will emerge the structure of law and the metaphysics of justice. I shall explore those aspects of Cyberspace which cause geography to be problematic for Positive Law Theory and show how these are essential, unavoidable and beneficial. I will then apply Aquinas’s structure of law and metaphysics of justice to these characteristics. From this will emerge an alternative approach to cyberlaw which has no problem with the nature of Cyberspace as it is but treats it as a positive foundation for new legal developments.
"Much of our understanding of current privacy norms stems from work that analyzes people's privacy preferences and behaviors (Altman, 1977; Capurro, 2005; Palen & Dourish, 2003). Westin's (1970) foundational research benchmarked American public opinion on privacy. "
"as Western-centric concept that does not exist in an individualistic form in non-Western societies (Burk, 2007; Hongladarom, 2007; Zureik and Harling Stalker, 2010, p. 12). There have also been discussions of the concept of privacy based on ideology critique (Stahl, 2007) and intercultural philosophy (see for example: Capurro, 2005; Ess, 2005). These critiques show that the question is therefore not how privacy can be best protected, but in which cases whose privacy should be protected and in which cases it should not be protected. "
[Show abstract][Hide abstract] ABSTRACT: Purpose – There are a lot of discussions about privacy in relation to contemporary communication systems (such as Facebook and other “social media” platforms), but discussions about privacy on the internet in most cases misses a profound understanding of the notion of privacy and where this notion is coming from. The purpose of this paper is to challenge the liberal notion of privacy and explore foundations of an alternative privacy conception. Design/methodology/approach – A typology of privacy definitions is elaborated based on Giddens' theory of structuration. The concept of privacy fetishism that is based on critical political economy is introduced. Limits of the liberal concept of privacy are discussed. This discussion is connected to the theories of Marx, Arendt and Habermas. Some foundations of an alternative privacy concept are outlined. Findings – The notion of privacy fetishism is introduced for criticizing naturalistic accounts of privacy. Marx and Engels have advanced four elements of the critique of the liberal privacy concept that were partly taken up by Arendt and Habermas: privacy as atomism that advances; possessive individualism that harms the public good; legitimizes and reproduces the capitalist class structure; and capitalist patriarchy. Research limitations/implications – Given the criticisms advanced in this paper, the need for an alternative, socialist privacy concept is ascertained and it is argued that privacy rights should be differentiated according to the position individuals occupy in the power structure, so that surveillance makes transparent wealth and income gaps and company's profits and privacy protects workers and consumers from capitalist domination. Originality/value – The paper contributes to the establishment of a concept of privacy that is grounded in critical political economy. Owing to the liberal bias of the privacy concept, the theorization of privacy has thus far been largely ignored in critical political economy. The paper contributes to illuminating this blind spot.
Journal of Information Communication and Ethics in Society 11/2011; 9(4). DOI:10.1108/14779961111191039
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