Article

Strategic absentmindedness in finitely repeated games

Top (impact factor: 0.87). 04/2012; 17(1):85-95. DOI:10.1007/s11750-009-0086-3 pp.85-95

ABSTRACT In this paper we consider finitely repeated games in which players can unilaterally commit to behave in an absentminded way
in some stages of the repeated game. We prove that the standard conditions for folk theorems can be substantially relaxed
when players are able to make this kind of compromises, both in the Nash and in the subgame perfect case. We also analyze
the relation of our model with the repeated games with unilateral commitments studied, for instance, in García-Jurado etal.
(Int. Game Theory Rev. 2:129–139, 2000).

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Keywords

compromises
 
Game Theory Rev
 
games
 
García-Jurado etal
 
Int
 
Nash
 
repeated game
 
repeated games
 
standard conditions
 
subgame perfect case
 
unilateral commitments
 

Ignacio García-Jurado