Conference Paper

A Formally Verified Device Authentication Protocol Using Casper/FDR

DOI: 10.1109/TrustCom.2012.27 Conference: Trust comm

ABSTRACT For communication in Next Generation Networks,
highly-developed mobile devices will enable users to store and
manage a lot of credentials on their terminals. Furthermore,
these terminals will represent and act on behalf of users when
accessing different networks and connecting to a wide variety
of services. In this situation, it is essential for users to trust
their terminals and for all transactions using them to be
secure. This paper analyses a number of the Authentication
and Key Agreement protocols between the users and mobile
terminals, then proposes a novel device authentication protocol.
The proposed protocol is analysed and verified using a formal
methods approach based on Casper/FDR compiler

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    ABSTRACT: Next Generation Networks comprise a wide variety of access technologies such as 2G/3G, WLAN as well as the Long-Term Evolution (LTE) networks. In this environment, mobile devices are expected to store sensitive data and represent users to access the underlying networks and connect to a wide variety of sensitive servers. It is crucial, in this sense, for end users to trust their mobile devices and for all transactions using them to be secure. Therefore, a number of communication frameworks in Next Generation Networks have been working on designing device authentication protocols that achieve mutual authentication between users and mobile terminals. This paper analyses some of these protocols and introduces two new device authentication protocols, verifies them using formal methods approach and discusses how they achieved desired security proprieties. The performance analysis highlights another advantage of the proposed protocols.
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    03/2012, Degree: Doctor of Philosophy- PhD
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