Conference Paper

Providing secrecy with lattice codes

Electr. Eng. Dept., Pennsylvania State Univ., University Park, PA
DOI: 10.1109/ALLERTON.2008.4797696 Conference: Communication, Control, and Computing, 2008 46th Annual Allerton Conference on
Source: IEEE Xplore

ABSTRACT Recent results have shown that lattice codes can be used to construct good channel codes, source codes and physical layer network codes for Gaussian channels. On the other hand, for Gaussian channels with secrecy constraints, efforts to date rely on random codes. In this work, we provide a tool to bridge these two areas so that the secrecy rate can be computed when lattice codes are used. In particular, we address the problem of bounding equivocation rates under nonlinear modulus operation that is present in lattice encoders/decoders. The technique is then demonstrated in two Gaussian channel examples: (1) a Gaussian wiretap channel with a cooperative jammer, and (2) a multi-hop line network from a source to a destination with untrusted intermediate relay nodes from whom the information needs to be kept secret. In both cases, lattice codes are used to facilitate cooperative jamming. In the second case, interestingly, we demonstrate that a non-vanishing positive secrecy rate is achievable regardless of the number of hops.

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