We illustrate how VSpyware - Vehicular Spyware - may jeopardize the integrity of vehicular systems. We propose a complete framework to protect vehicles against this threat based on a generic five-level protection scheme and customize it for the standardized and open specifications of AUTOSAR. We then inspect the vulnerabilities of the embedded operating systems, specifically OSEK OS, which is adopted by AUTOSAR, and propose methods to implement protection at this level. Finally, we show how our design thwarts VSpyware and VMalware attacks and protects the privacy and security of drivers and passengers.
[Show abstract][Hide abstract] ABSTRACT: A vast majority of distributed embedded systems is concerned by security risks. The fact that applications may result poorly protected is partially due to methodological lacks in the engineering development process. More specifically, methodologies targeting formal verification may lack support to certain phases of the development process. Particularly, system modeling frameworks may be complex-to-use or not address security at all. Along with that, testing is not usually addressed by verification methodologies since formal verification and testing are considered as exclusive stages. Nevertheless, we believe that platform testing can be applied to ensure that properties formally verified in a model are truly endowed to the real system. Our contribution is made in the scope of a model-driven based methodology that, in particular, targets secure-by-design embedded systems. The methodology is an iterative process that pursues coverage of several engineering development phases and that relies upon existing security analysis techniques. Still in evolution, the methodology is mainly defined via a high level SysML profile named Avatar. The contribution specifically consists on extending Avatar so as to model security concerns and in formally defining a model transformation towards a verification framework. This contribution allows to conduct proofs on authenticity and confidentiality. We illustrate how a cryptographic protocol is partially secured by applying several methodology stages. In addition, it is described how Security Testing was conducted on an embedded prototype platform within the scope of an automotive project.
01/2013, Degree: PhD, Supervisor: Ludovic Apvrille and Renaud Pacalet
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