Conference Paper
A Game Theoretic Framework for Generation Maintenance Scheduling in Oligopolistic Electricity Markets
K.N. Toosi Univ. of Technol., Tehran, Iran
DOI: 10.1109/ISAP.2009.5352828 Conference: Intelligent System Applications to Power Systems, 2009. ISAP '09. 15th International Conference on Source: IEEE Xplore
 Citations (12)
 Cited In (0)

Conference Paper: A novel approach for maintenance scheduling of generating units in a competitive environment
[Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
ABSTRACT: In this paper, a new approach for maintenance scheduling of generating units of GENCOs in competitive environment is presented. In this environment, management of GENCOs and grid is separated, each maximizing its own benefit. The objective function for the GENCO is to sell electricity as much as possible, at proper time according to the market clearing price forecast. Various technical constraints such as generation capacity, duration of maintenances and maintenance continuity are being taken into account. The objective function of ISO is to maximize the reliability throughout the year; provided the energy purchase cost should be smaller than a predetermined amount when the units of GENCOs are out for maintenance. Therefore there are two objective functions for finding an optimum maintenance schedule in restructured power systems. In this paper we apply genetic algorithm methodology for finding the optimum preventive maintenance schedule of generating unitsPower India Conference, 2006 IEEE; 05/2006  [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
ABSTRACT: Maintenance decisions in an oligopolistic market attains a strategic dimension because gencos are often able to manipulate market prices through capacity withdrawal. A closely related issue is that of strategically withholding generation from available capacity. An analytic framework is presented that enables joint evaluation of maintenance and generation strategies. The CournotNash equilibrium (CNE) concept is extended for intertemporal decision making on maintenance and generation for multiple gencos. Each Genco maximizes its profit by strategically putting its capacity on maintenance as well as withholding generation from available capacity, taking into account its rival gencos decisions. The CNE problem is posed as a continuous, or mixed integer, nonlinear programming optimization problem. Duality theory is employed to derive insights about the marginal profit that a genco may earn from an increment in its availability in an oligopolistic market setup. Illustrative numerical examples are presented of CNE maintenance and generation strategies and these are compared and contrasted against those of a perfectly competitive scenario.IEEE Transactions on Power Systems 12/2004; · 3.53 Impact Factor  [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
ABSTRACT: This paper presents an application of noncooperative game theory to generation expansion planning (GEP) in a competitive electricity industry. We apply the Cournot model of oligopoly behavior to formulate a GEP model that may characterize expansion planning in a competitive regime, particularly in pooldominated generation supply industries. Numerical experiments are conducted on a test system to analyze generation investment and market participation decisions of candidate expansion units that vary in costs and forced outage rates. The numerical results point to: (1) greater industry expansion and system reliability under Coumot competition than under centralized expansion planning and (2) higher probabilistic measures of reliability from multiplayer expansion than from expansion by a traditional monopolist with an equivalent reserve margin requirement. Furthermore, we summarize analytical results involving a simplified version of the GEP game.IEEE Power Engineering Review 11/2001; 21(10):6363.
Data provided are for informational purposes only. Although carefully collected, accuracy cannot be guaranteed. The impact factor represents a rough estimation of the journal's impact factor and does not reflect the actual current impact factor. Publisher conditions are provided by RoMEO. Differing provisions from the publisher's actual policy or licence agreement may be applicable.