Conference Paper

A Game Theoretic Framework for Generation Maintenance Scheduling in Oligopolistic Electricity Markets

K.N. Toosi Univ. of Technol., Tehran, Iran
DOI: 10.1109/ISAP.2009.5352828 Conference: Intelligent System Applications to Power Systems, 2009. ISAP '09. 15th International Conference on
Source: IEEE Xplore

ABSTRACT This paper studies the maintenance decisions of generating companies (GENCOs) which are fully engaged in oligopolistic electricity market. Maintenance decisions in an oligopolistic electricity market have a strategic function, because GENCOs usually have impacts on market prices through capacity outages. The main contribution of this paper is modeling a game theoretic framework to analyze strategic behaviors of GENCOs. Each GENCO tries to maximize its payoff by strategically making decisions, taking into account its rival GENCOs' decisions. Cournot-Nash equilibrium is used for decision making on maintenance problem in Oligopolistic electricity market. The analytic framework presented in this paper enables joint assessment of maintenance and generation strategies; it also considers the regulation of ISO on GENCOs' desired maintenance plan.

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Available from: Mohammad Ali Fotouhi Ghazvini, Mar 17, 2015
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