Conference Paper

Performance Analysis of CHOKe with Multiple UDP Flows

Dept. of Electr. Eng., Korea Adv. Inst. of Sci. & Technol.
DOI: 10.1109/SICE.2006.315767 Conference: SICE-ICASE, 2006. International Joint Conference
Source: IEEE Xplore

ABSTRACT Several active queue management schemes have been proposed to provide the fairness among flows. In particular, CHOKe is stateless and simple to implement, but it can effectively penalize UDP flows which usually obtain more bandwidth than TCP flows. However, its performance has not been analyzed in terms of the UDP throughput and the Jain's fairness index in the extended case of multiple UDP flows. In this paper, we derive the UDP throughput and Jain's fairness index under CHOKe. The simulation results illustrate the accuracy of our analysis and verify our derived result

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