Article

Controlling Health Care Spending - The Massachusetts Experiment

Department of Health Care Policy, Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA, USA.
New England Journal of Medicine (Impact Factor: 54.42). 04/2012; 366(17):1560-1. DOI: 10.1056/NEJMp1201261
Source: PubMed

ABSTRACT As debate rages on about implementation of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), national attention is once again focused on Massachusetts, which instituted a similar comprehensive health care reform package in 2006. After expanding health insurance coverage to almost 98% of the state population, Massachusetts is now struggling to control increasing health care costs that threaten the continued viability of its reforms. This second phase of health care reform presents entirely new challenges. Whereas expanding coverage has popular appeal, cost control does not. Whereas expanding coverage injects additional dollars into the health care system, cost control does the opposite. Whereas expanding . . .

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