In this paper, we consider coordination issues of a distribution system composed of a manufacturer and a retailer. The manufacturer offers a single product to the retailer and the demand for the product at the retailer's end is stock dependent. We focus on three aspects of the resulting supply chain. First, we discuss the manufacturer-Stackelberg game structure to determine how the manufacturer sets the wholesale price of the product and how the retailer in turn determines the order quantity. We assume that both the parties share relevant cost information. Then we develop a simple profit-sharing mechanism that would ultimately achieve perfect channel coordination. Finally, the manufacturer is provided with a quantity discount scheme to induce the retailer to increase the order quantity so as to maximize the manufacturer's profit. We show that this discount scheme also achieves the perfect coordination of the whole channel. Numerical examples are used to illustrate the models.
"Many studies have focused on the effect of promotions on sales (Goyal & Gunasekaran, 1995; Ramanathan & Muyldermans, 2010; Sana, 2010, 2011a,b). Generally speaking, customers' purchasing behaviour is predicted from implication of promotions such as price discounting, advertising, free gifts, better services, delay-in-payments, stock display, etc (Goyal & Chang, 2009; Soni & Shah, 2008; Zhou, Min, & Goyal, 2008). Owing to advances in modern research, fuzziness of key parameters and variables is essential for analyzing any kind of inventory control problem. "
[Show abstract][Hide abstract] ABSTRACT: This paper deals with a new approach of linguistic dichotomous fuzzy variables for a classical backordered EOQ (Economic Order Quantity) model with PE (Promotional Effort) and selling price dependent demand rate. In practice, we have observed that the demand rate during a shortage period decreases with time. Based on these assumptions, we have developed a cost minimization problem (a crisp model) by trading off setup cost, inventory cost, backordering cost and cost for promotional effort. Then, we have studied a fuzzy model by considering the coefficient vectors as pentagon fuzzy numbers associated with some co-ordinates. Defuzzification is made with the help of the center-of-gravity method followed by a ranking index and the Euclidean distance of the objective function. Considering a numerical example, phi- (ϕ-)coefficients have been computed for each method and a decision is made according to the natural characteristics of the decision variables. Finally, conclusions are drawn, explaining the justification of the model.
"But, they have not considered the impact of stock dependency factors on return policy in coordinating the supply chain. Zhou et al. (2008)  in their recent work have considered the stock-dependent demand rate in coordinating a channel. "
[Show abstract][Hide abstract] ABSTRACT: In this paper, a coordination model is developed for a single manufacturer-single retailer distribution supply chain dealing with short life-cycle products, operating under price-sensitive and stock-dependent random demand. Here, the demand is modeled in additive fashion that captures the three features, namely, price-sensitivity, initial stock dependency and uncertainty of demand. A numerical study is carried out to illustrate the model and sensitivity analysis is performed to analyze the impact of price-sensitivity, stock-dependency, and demand uncertainty on the supply chain performance. It is found that under the same price-sensitivity, at higher levels of stock dependency, as the demand variability is increased, supply chain performance is decreased.
"This explains the saliency in the literature of price discounts over direct rebates as coordinating mechanisms (e.g. Zhou et al., 2008). This paper studies the impact, within a single period framework, of direct rebates from the manufacturer and/or from the retailer to the end customer upon the profit-maximizing operational and pricing policies of the manufacturer and of the retailer. "
[Show abstract][Hide abstract] ABSTRACT: This paper studies the impact of direct rebates to the end customer from the manufacturer and/or from the retailer upon the profitability and effectiveness of the policies of both channels. Effectiveness is measured by the ratio of the retailer’s to the manufacturer’s profits and by the sum of the profits for the two parties across scenarios wherein at least one of the parties offers a rebate. The main result is to prove analytically the conditions under which either all three scenarios are equally profitable or the retailer-only rebate policy is dominant. Another important result is to illustrate the likelihood that the manufacturer is able to coordinate the supply chain, by the appropriate choice of its pricing and rebate policies, thereby inducing the retailer to do likewise with its associated best pricing, ordering and rebate policies. Finally, numerical examples highlight the main features of the paper.
Fuel and Energy Abstracts 06/2012; 219(2). DOI:10.1016/j.ejor.2011.06.044
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