Article

Origin authentication in interdomain routing

Computer Science and Engineering, Pennsylvania State University, 344 IST Building, University Park, PA 16802, United States; Department of Computer Science, University of British Columbia, 201 Main Mall, Vancouver, Canada, BC V6T 1Z4; Center for Computational Learning Systems, Columbia University, 475 Riverside Ave, New York, NY 10115, United States
Computer Networks (Impact Factor: 1.23). 11/2003; DOI: 10.1016/j.comnet.2005.11.007
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ABSTRACT Attacks against Internet routing are increasing in number and severity. Contributing greatly to these attacks is the absence of origin authentication; there is no way to validate claims of address ownership or location. The lack of such services not only enables attacks by malicious entities, but also indirectly allows seemingly inconsequential misconfigurations to disrupt large portions of the Internet. This paper considers the semantics, design, and costs of origin authentication in interdomain routing. We formalize the semantics of address delegation and use on the Internet, and develop and characterize original, broad classes of origin authentication proof systems. We estimate the address delegation graph representing the current use of IPv4 address space using available routing data. This effort reveals that current address delegation is dense and relatively static: as few as 16 entities perform 80% of the delegation on the Internet. We conclude by evaluating the proposed services via trace-based simulation, which demonstrates that the enhanced proof systems can significantly reduce resource costs associated with origin authentication.

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