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LABORES (URA 362, CNRS), Université catholique de Lille, France; FNRS, CORE, and IRES, Université catholique de Louvain, Voie du Roman Pays 34, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (Impact Factor: 1.01). 02/2004; DOI:10.1016/j.jebo.2003.01.007
Source: RePEc

ABSTRACT We develop a two-person negotiation model with complete information that makes endogenous both the deadline and the level of surplus destruction after the deadline. We show that the undominated Nash equilibrium outcome is always unique but might be inefficient. Moreover, as the bargaining period becomes short or as the players become very patient, the unique undominated Nash equilibrium outcome is always inefficient.

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