Article

Ordering infinite utility streams

Département de Sciences Economiques and CIREQ, Université de Montréal, C.P. 6128, succursale Centre-ville, Montréal QC, Canada H3C 3J7
Journal of Economic Theory (Impact Factor: 1.24). 02/2007; DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.03.005
Source: RePEc

ABSTRACT We reconsider the problem of ordering infinite utility streams. As has been established in earlier contributions, if no representability condition is imposed, there exist strongly Paretian and finitely anonymous orderings of intertemporal utility streams. We examine the possibility of adding suitably formulated versions of classical equity conditions. First, we provide a characterization of all ordering extensions of the generalized Lorenz criterion as the only strongly Paretian and finitely anonymous rankings satisfying the strict transfer principle. Second, we offer a characterization of an infinite-horizon extension of leximin obtained by adding an equity-preference axiom to strong Pareto and finite anonymity.

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