Article

Filovirus Outbreak Detection and Surveillance: Lessons From Bundibugyo

Viral Special Pathogens Branch, The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia 30333, USA.
The Journal of Infectious Diseases (Impact Factor: 5.78). 11/2011; 204 Suppl 3:S761-7. DOI: 10.1093/infdis/jir294
Source: PubMed

ABSTRACT The first outbreak of Ebola hemorrhagic fever (EHF) due to Bundibugyo ebolavirus occurred in Uganda from August to December 2007. During outbreak response and assessment, we identified 131 EHF cases (44 suspect, 31 probable, and 56 confirmed). Consistent with previous large filovirus outbreaks, a long temporal lag (approximately 3 months) occurred between initial EHF cases and the subsequent identification of Ebola virus and outbreak response, which allowed for prolonged person-to-person transmission of the virus. Although effective control measures for filovirus outbreaks, such as patient isolation and contact tracing, are well established, our observations from the Bundibugyo EHF outbreak demonstrate the need for improved filovirus surveillance, reporting, and diagnostics, in endemic locations in Africa.

2 Followers
 · 
171 Views
  • [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: To understand the barriers and enablers for UK healthcare workers who are considering going to work in the current Ebola outbreak in West Africa, but have not yet volunteered. After focus group discussions, and a pilot questionnaire, an anonymous survey was conducted using SurveyMonkey to determine whether people had considered going to West Africa, what factors might make them more or less likely to volunteer, and whether any of these were modifiable factors. The survey was publicised among doctors, nurses, laboratory staff and allied health professionals. 3109 people answered the survey, of whom 472 (15%) were considering going to work in the epidemic but had not yet volunteered. 1791 (57.6%) had not considered going, 704 (22.6%) had considered going but decided not to, 53 (1.7%) had volunteered to go and 14 (0.45%) had already been and worked in the epidemic. For those considering going to West Africa, the most important factor preventing them from volunteering was a lack of information to help them decide; fear of getting Ebola and partners' concerns came next. Uncertainty about their potential role, current work commitments and inability to get agreement from their employer were also important barriers, whereas clarity over training would be an important enabler. In contrast, for those who were not considering going, or who had decided against going, family considerations and partner concerns were the most important factors. More UK healthcare workers would volunteer to help tackle Ebola in West Africa if there was better information available, including clarity about roles, cover arrangements, and training. This could be achieved with a well-publicised high quality portal of reliable information.
    PLoS ONE 03/2015; 10(3):e0120013. DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0120013 · 3.53 Impact Factor
  • [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: On 23 March 2014, the World Health Organization first announced a new Ebola virus outbreak that started in December 2013 in the eastern part of the Republic of Guinea. Human infections shortly emerged in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Nigeria. On 30 September 2014, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention confirmed through laboratory testing the first Ebola virus infection diagnosed in the USA, in a patient who travelled from West Africa to Texas. On 6 October 2014, the first human infection occurring outside of Africa was reported, in a Spanish nurse who treated two priests, both of whom died, and on 23 October 2014, the first human infection was reported in New York City. To date, the 2014 Ebola virus outbreak is the longest, largest, and most persistent one since 1976, when the virus was first identified in humans, and the number of human cases exceeded, as of mid-September 2014, the cumulative number of infections from all the previous outbreaks. The early clinical presentation overlaps with other infectious diseases, opening differential diagnosis difficulties. Understanding the transmission routes and identifying the natural reservoir of the virus are additional challenges in studying Ebola hemorrhagic fever outbreaks. Ebola virus is as much a public health challenge for developing countries as it is for the developed world, and previous outbreaks underscored that the relative contribution of the risk factors may differ among outbreaks. The implementation of effective preparedness plans is contingent on integrating teachings from previous Ebola virus outbreaks with those from the current outbreak and with lessons provided by other infectious diseases, along with developing a multifaceted inter-disciplinary and cross-disciplinary framework that should be established and shaped by biomedical as well as sociopolitical sciences. © 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
    International Journal of Clinical Practice 12/2014; 69(1). DOI:10.1111/ijcp.12593 · 2.54 Impact Factor
  • [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: Introduction: Viral hemorrhagic fever (VHF) outbreaks, with high mortality rates, have often been amplified in African health institutions due to person-to-person transmission via infected body fluids. By collating and analyzing epidemiological data from documented outbreaks, we observed that diagnostic delay contributes to epidemic size for Ebola and Marburg hemorrhagic fever outbreaks. Methodology: We used a susceptible-exposed-infectious-removed (SEIR) model and data from the 1995 outbreak in Kikwit, Democratic Republic of Congo, to simulate Ebola hemorrhagic fever epidemics. Our model allows us to describe the dynamics for hospital staff separately from that for the general population, and to implement health worker-specific interventions. Results: The model illustrates that implementing World Health Organization/US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention guidelines of isolating patients who do not respond to antimalarial and antibacterial chemotherapy reduces total outbreak size, from a median of 236, by 90% or more. Routinely employing diagnostic testing in post-mortems of patients that died of refractory fevers reduces the median outbreak size by a further 60%. Even greater reductions in outbreak size were seen when all febrile patients were tested for endemic infections or when febrile health-care workers were tested. The effect of testing strategies was not impaired by the 1-3 day delay that would occur if testing were performed by a reference laboratory. Conclusion: In addition to improving the quality of care for common causes of febrile infections, increased and strategic use of laboratory diagnostics for fever could reduce the chance of hospital amplification of VHFs in resource-limited African health systems.
    The Journal of Infection in Developing Countries 09/2014; 8(09). DOI:10.3855/jidc.4636 · 1.27 Impact Factor