Article

On the Actual Inefficiency of Efficient Negotiation Methods

01/2012;
Source: arXiv

ABSTRACT In this contribution we analyze the effect that mutual information has on the
actual performance of efficient negotiation methods. Specifically, we start by
proposing the theoretical notion of Abstract Negotiation Method (ANM) as a map
from the negotiation domain in itself, for any utility profile of the parties.
ANM can face both direct and iterative negotiations, since we show that ANM
class is closed under the limit operation. The generality of ANM is proven by
showing that it captures a large class of well known in literature negotiation
methods. Hence we show that if mutual information is assumed then any Pareto
efficient ANM is manipulable by one single party or by a collusion of few of
them. We concern about the efficiency of the resulting manipulation. Thus we
find necessarily and sufficient conditions those make manipulability equivalent
to actual inefficiency, meaning that the manipulation implies a change of the
efficient frontier so the Pareto efficient ANM converges to a different, hence
actually inefficient, frontier. In particular we distinguish between strong and
weak actual inefficiency. Where, the strong actual inefficiency is a drawback
which is not possible to overcome of the ANMs, like the Pareto invariant one,
so its negotiation result is invariant for any two profiles of utility sharing
the same Pareto frontier, we present. While the weak actual inefficiency is a
drawback of any mathematical theorization on rational agents which constrain in
a particular way their space of utility functions. For the weak actual
inefficiency we state a principle of Result's Inconsistency by showing that to
falsify theoretical hypotheses is rational for any agent which is informed
about the preference of the other, even if the theoretical assumptions, which
constrain the space of agents' utilities, are exact in the reality, i.e. the
preferences of each single agent are well modeled.

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Keywords

Abstract Negotiation Method

efficient negotiation methods

falsify theoretical hypotheses

iterative negotiations

make manipulability equivalent

mathematical theorization

mutual information

negotiation result

Pareto efficient ANM converges

Pareto frontier

Pareto invariant

Result's Inconsistency

resulting manipulation

single agent

strong actual inefficiency

sufficient conditions

theoretical notion

two profiles

utility profile

weak actual inefficiency