Conference Paper

PSH: A Private and Shared History-Based Incentive Mechanism.

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-70587-1_2 Conference: Resilient Networks and Services, Second International Conference on Autonomous Infrastructure, Management and Security, AIMS 2008, Bremen, Germany, July 1-3, 2008, Proceedings
Source: DBLP

ABSTRACT Fully decentralized peer-to-peer (P2P) systems do not have a central control mechanism. Thus, different forms of control mechanisms are required to deal with selfish peers. One type of selfish behavior is the consumption of resources without providing sufficient resources. Therefore, incentive schemes encourage peers to share resources while punishing selfish peers. A well-known example of an incentive scheme is Tit-for-Tat (TFT), as used in BitTorrent. With this scheme, a peer can only consume as much resources as it provides. TFT is resilient to collusion due to relying on private histories only. However, TFT can only be applied to peers with direct reciprocity. This paper presents a private and shared history (PSH) based incentive mechanism, which supports transitive relations (indirect reciprocity). Furthermore, it is resilient to collusion and it combines private and shared histories in an efficient manner. The PSH approach uses a shared history for identifying transitive relations. Those relations are verified using private histories. Simulations show that the PSH mechanism has a higher transaction success ratio than TFT.


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May 28, 2014