Conference Paper

The Emergence of Cooperation in Asynchronous Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma.

DOI: 10.1007/11903697_93 Conference: Simulated Evolution and Learning, 6th International Conference, SEAL 2006, Hefei, China, October 15-18, 2006, Proceedings
Source: DBLP


The Iterated Prisoners Dilemma (IPD) has received much attention because of its ability to demonstrate altruistic behavior. How- ever, most studies focus on the synchronous case, where players make their decisions simultaneously. As this is implausible in most biological contexts, a more generalized approach is required to study the emergence of altruistic behavior in an evolutionary context. Here, we take previous results and present a generalized Markov model for asynchronous IPD, where both, one, or neither player can make a decision at a given time step. We show that the type of asynchronous timing introduced into the model influences the strategy that dominates. The framework presented here is a more biologically plausible scenario through which to investigate altruistic behavior.

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Available from: David Newth, Nov 04, 2014
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