Conference Paper

A game theory-based approach to reducing interference in dense deployments of home wireless networks.

Dept. of Comput. Sci., Univ. of Cyprus, Nicosia, Cyprus
DOI: 10.1109/ISCC.2011.5983969 Conference: Proceedings of the 16th IEEE Symposium on Computers and Communications, ISCC 2011, Kerkyra, Corfu, Greece, June 28 - July 1, 2011
Source: DBLP

ABSTRACT Urban residential areas are becoming increasingly
dense with more and more home networks being deployed in
close proximity. The paper considers a dense urban residential
area where each house/unit has its own wireless access point (AP),
deployed without any coordination with other such units. In this
situation, it would be much better if neighbouring APs — i.e.,
APs that are physically close to each other — would form groups,
where one member of the group would serve the terminals of
all group members in addition to its own terminals, while the
other access points of the group can be silent or even turned
off, thus reducing interference and increasing overall Quality of
Experience (QoE). The fact that participating units are deployed
without any coordination makes the overall QoE vulnerable
to the selfish behaviour of each unit. We propose a protocol
where each unit operates in an equilibrium of a cooperativeneighbourhood
game. We show using a game theoretic model
that there exists a motivation for APs to enter and remain in
cooperative neighbourhoods, in which interference is decreased
due to the voluntary cooperation of the neighbours.

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    ABSTRACT: Urban residential areas are becoming increasingly dense with more and more wireless home networks being deployed in close proximity. Considering that in such a dense urban residential area, each unit has its own wireless access point (AP), deployed without any coordination with other such units, then a need arises for reducing interference and increasing overall Quality of Experience (QoE) of the clients involved. To do this, we propose that neighbouring APs - i.e., APs that are physically close to each other - form groups, where one member of the group serves the terminals of all group members in addition to its own terminals, while the other APs of the group can be silent or even turned off. The fact that participating units are deployed without any coordination makes the overall QoE vulnerable to the selfish behaviour of each unit. We propose a cooperative-neighbourhood graphical game model comprising of a network of selfishly-oriented nodes represented by a graph where the outgoing links of a certain node capture the improvement in utility that a neighbour's client may experience from a potential cooperation. We show and prove that using the proposed model provides motivation for APs to enter and remain in cooperative neighbourhoods, in which interference is decreased due to the voluntary cooperation of the neighbours.
    Ad Hoc Networking Workshop (Med-Hoc-Net), 2012 The 11th Annual Mediterranean; 01/2012
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    Game Theory Relaunched, Edited by Prof. Hardy Hanappi, 01/2013: chapter A Graphical Game for Cooperative Neighbourhoods of Selfishly Oriented Entities; InTech., ISBN: ISBN: 978-953-51-1078-1
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    ABSTRACT: Since the beginning of power system restructuring and creation of numerous temporal power markets, transmission congestion has become a serious challenge for independent system operators around the globe. On the other hand, in recent years, emission reduction has become a major concern for the electricity industry. As a widely accepted solution, attention has been drawn to renewable power resources promotion. However, penetration of these resources impacts on transmission congestion. In sum, these challenges reinforce the need for new approaches to facilitate interaction between the operator and energy market players defined as the generators (power generation companies) in order to provide proper operational signals for the operator. The main purpose of this chapter is to provide a combination of a leader–follower game theoretical mechanism and multiattribute decision-making for the operator to choose his best strategy by considering congestion-driven and environmental attributes. First the operator (as the leader) chooses K strategies arbitrarily. Each strategy is constituted by emission penalty factors for each generator, the amount of purchased power from renewable power resources, and a bid cap that provides a maximum bid for the price of electrical power for generators who intend to sell their power in the market. For each of the K strategies, the generators (as the followers) determine their optimum bids for selling power in the market. The interaction between generation companies is modeled as Nash-Supply Function equilibrium (SFE) game. Thereafter, for each of the K strategies, the operator performs congestion management and congestion-driven attributes and emission are obtained. The four different attributes are congestion cost, average locational marginal price (LMP) for different system buses, variance of the LMPs, and the generators’ emission. Finally, the operator’s preferred strategy is selected using the Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS). The proposed procedure is applied to the IEEE reliability 24-bus test system and the results are analyzed.

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