Can a robot deceive humans?
ABSTRACT In the present study, we investigated whether a robot is able to deceive a human by producing a behavior against him/her prediction. A feeling of being deceived by a robot would be a strong indicator that the human treat the robot as an intentional entity. We conducted a psychological experiment in which a subject played Darumasan ga Koronda, a Japanese children's game, with a robot. A main strategy to deceive a subject was to make his/her mind believe that the robot is stupid so as not to be able to move quickly. The experimental result indicated that unexpected change of a robot behavior gave rise to an impression of being deceived by the robot.
- SourceAvailable from: behav.org[show abstract] [hide abstract]
ABSTRACT: Our ability to explain and predict other people's behaviour by attributing to them independent mental states, such as beliefs and desires, is known as having a 'theory of mind'. Interest in this very human ability has engendered a growing body of evidence concerning its evolution and development and the biological basis of the mechanisms underpinning it. Functional imaging has played a key role in seeking to isolate brain regions specific to this ability. Three areas are consistently activated in association with theory of mind. These are the anterior paracingulate cortex, the superior temporal sulci and the temporal poles bilaterally. This review discusses the functional significance of each of these areas within a social cognitive network.Trends in Cognitive Sciences 03/2003; 7(2):77-83. · 16.01 Impact Factor
- 01/1995; MIT Press.
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ABSTRACT: A series of experiments were performed to investigate how motion sequences provide information about the intentional structure of moving figures or actors. Observers had to detect simulations of biologically meaningful motion within a set of moving letters. In the first two experiments a factorial design was used, with type of instruction as a between-subject factor and six movement parameters (number of items, speed and directness of target and distractors, and 'relentlessness' of target movement) as within-subject factor; in the final two experiments, the visibility of the goal towards which the target moved and the use of a tracking movement to distinguish the target were varied. In such displays search time increases with increasing number of stimuli. It was found that (a) the more direct the motion, the more likely it was to be interpreted as intentional; (b) intentional motion was much easier to detect when the target moved faster than the distractors than when it moved more slowly; (c) recognition of intentionality was impaired but not abolished if the goal towards which the target was moving was invisible; and (d) participants did not report intentional movement when the target was distinguished by brightness rather than the manner in which it moved. We argue that the perception of intentionality is strongly related to observers' use of conceptual knowledge, which in turn is activated by particular combinations of features. This supports a process model, in which intentionality is seen as the result of a conceptual integration of objective visual features.Perception 02/1994; 23(3):253-68. · 1.31 Impact Factor