Conference Paper

Manipulation in group argument evaluation.

DOI: 10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-032 Conference: 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2011), Taipei, Taiwan, May 2-6, 2011, Volume 1-3
Source: DBLP

ABSTRACT Given an argumentation framework and a group of agents, the individuals may have divergent opinions on the status of the arguments. If the group needs to reach a common position on the argumentation framework, the question is how the individual evaluations can be mapped into a collective one. This problem has been recently investigated in 1]. In this paper, we study under which conditions these operators are Pareto optimal and whether they are manipulable.

0 Bookmarks
 · 
100 Views
  • Source
    [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: The current implementation provides a demonstration of a number of basic argumentation components that can be applied in the context of multi-agent systems. These components include algorithms for calculating argumentation semantics, as well as for determining the justification status of the arguments and providing explanation in the form of formal discussion games. Furthermore, the current demonstrator also includes the first implementation we know of regarding argument-based judgment aggregation theory.
    10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2011), Taipei, Taiwan, May 2-6, 2011, Volume 1-3; 01/2011
  • [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: The present notes are an improved version of the notes that served as teaching materials for the course Introduction to Judgment Aggregation given at the 23rd European Summer School on Logic, Language and Information (ESSLLI'11, Ljubljana). The notes are structured as follows: Section 1 introduces the field of judgment aggregation, its relations to preference aggregation and some formal preliminaries. Section 2 shows that the paradox that originated judgment aggregation is not a problem limited to propositionwise majority voting but a more general issue, illustrated by an impossibility theorem of judgment aggregation that is here proven. The relaxation of some conditions used in impossibility results in judgment aggregation may lead to escape routes from the impossibility theorems. These escape routes are explored in Section 3. Section 4 presents the issue of manipulation that arises when voters strategically misrepresent their true vote in order to force a different outcome in the aggregation process. Finally, we conclude by sketching a list of on-going research in the field of judgment aggregation (Section 5).
    Proceedings of the 2010 conference on ESSLLI 2010, and ESSLLI 2011 conference on Lectures on Logic and Computation; 08/2010
  • [Show abstract] [Hide abstract]
    ABSTRACT: An argumentation framework can be seen as expressing, in an abstract way, the conflicting information of an underlying logical knowledge base. This conflicting information often allows for the presence of more than one possible reasonable position (extension/labelling) which one can take. A relevant question, therefore, is how much these positions differ from each other. In the current paper, we will examine the issue of how to define meaningful measures of distance between the (complete) labellings of a given argumentation framework. We provide concrete distance measures based on argument-wise label difference, as well as based on the notion of critical sets, and examine their properties.
    Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1; 06/2012

Full-text (2 Sources)

Download
41 Downloads
Available from
May 26, 2014