Conference Paper

System Call API Obfuscation (Extended Abstract).

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-87403-4_36 Conference: Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection, 11th International Symposium, RAID 2008, Cambridge, MA, USA, September 15-17, 2008. Proceedings
Source: DBLP

ABSTRACT We claim that attacks can evade the comprehension of security tools that rely on knowledge of standard system call interfaces
to reason about process execution behavior. Our attack, called Illusion, will invoke privileged operations in a Windows or Linux kernel at the request of user-level processes without requiring
those processes to call the actual system calls corresponding to the operations. The Illusion interface will hide system operations
from user-, kernel-, and hypervisor-level monitors mediating the conventional system-call interface. Illusion will alter neither
static kernel code nor read-only dispatch tables, remaining elusive from tools protecting kernel memory.

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