Conference Paper

Tight Bounds for Unconditional Authentication Protocols in the Manual Channel and Shared Key Models.

Conference: Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2006, 26th Annual International Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, California, USA, August 20-24, 2006, Proceedings
Source: DBLP
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    ABSTRACT: The Secure message authentication is an important part of quantum cryptography. The eavesdropper gains partial knowledge on the key in cryptography. Partial knowledge has little result on the authentication part of the system. Using BB84 protocol, the sender will generate the random number, the random number sent as a secret shared key. The secret shared key also called as “check bits”. The communication parties are getting together and then they form as a single group depending upon the category. It is proposed to share theinformation among the communicating parties using quantum ryptography without any attack.
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    ABSTRACT: We investigate unconditional security for message authentication protocols that are designed using two-channel cryptography. (Two-channel cryptography employs a broadband, insecure wireless channel and an authenticated, narrow-band manual channel at the same time.) We study both noninteractive message authentication protocols (NIMAPs) and interactive message authentication protocols (IMAPs) in this setting. First, we provide a new proof of nonexistence of nontrivial unconditionally secure NIMAPs. This proof consists of a combinatorial counting argument and is much shorter than the previous proof by Wang and Safavi-Naini, which was based on probability distribution arguments. We also prove a new result which holds in a weakened attack model. Further, we propose a generalization of an unconditionally secure 3-round IMAP due to Naor, Segev and Smith. The IMAP is based on two \epsilon-\Delta universal hash families. With a careful choice of parameters, our scheme improves that of Naor et al. Our scheme is very close to optimal for most parameter situations of practical interest. Finally, a variation of the 3-round IMAP is presented, in which only one hash family is required.
    Designs Codes and Cryptography 05/2010; 55(2-3). DOI:10.1007/s10623-009-9352-5 · 0.73 Impact Factor


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