Conference Paper

The Bistable Ring PUF: A new architecture for strong Physical Unclonable Functions.

DOI: 10.1109/HST.2011.5955011 Conference: HOST 2011, Proceedings of the 2011 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust (HOST), 5-6 June 2011, San Diego, California, USA
Source: DBLP

ABSTRACT This paper introduces a new architecture for circuit- based Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) which we call the Bistable Ring PUF (BR-PUF). Based on experimental results obtained from FPGA-based implementations of the BR-PUF, the quality of this new design is discussed in different aspects, including uniqueness and reliability. On the basis of the observed complexity in the challenge-response behavior of BR-PUFs, we argue that this new PUF could be a promising candidate for Strong PUFs. Our design shows noticeable temperature sensitivity, but we discuss how this problem can be addressed by additional hardware and protocol measures.

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